# 1NC

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#### The 1AC’s silence was strategic—their failure to mention the ANIMAL is a human centric ethic that must be rejected—the impact is ecological collapse and extinction.

Ahkin ‘10 (Melanie Ahkin, Monash University, 2010, “Human Centrism, Animist Materialism, and the Critique of Rationalism in Val Plumwood’s Critical Ecological Feminism,” Emergent Australian Philosophers, a peer reviewed journal of philosophy,http://www.eap.philosophy-australia.com/archives.html)  
  
These five features provide the basis for hegemonic centrism insofar as they promote certain conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality which universalise and naturalise the standpoint of the superior relata as primary or centre, and deny and subordinate the standpoints of inferiorised others as secondary or derivative. Using standpoint theory analysis, Plumwood's reconceptualisation of human chauvinist frameworks locates and dissects these logical characteristics of dualism, and the conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality common to centric structures, as follows. Radical exclusion is found in the rationalist emphasis on differences between humans and non-human nature, its valourisation of a human rationality conceived as exclusionary of nature, and its minimisation of similarities between the two realms. Homogenisation and stereotyping occur especially in the rationalist denial of consciousness to nature, and its denial of the diversity of mental characteristics found within its many different constituents, facilitating a perception of nature as homogeneous and of its members as interchangeable and replaceable resources. This definition of nature in terms of its **lack** of human rationality and consciousness means that its identity remains relative to that of the dominant human group, and its difference is marked as deficiency, permitting its inferiorisation. Backgrounding and denial may be observed in the conception of nature as extraneous and inessential background to the foreground of human culture, in the human denial of dependency on the natural environment, and denial of the ethical and political constraints which the unrecognised ends and needs of non-human nature might otherwise place on human behaviour. These features together create an ethical discontinuity between humans and non-human nature which denies nature's value and agency, and thereby promote its instrumentalisation and exploitation for the benefit of humans.11 This dualistic logic helps to universalise the human centric standpoint, making invisible and seemingly inevitable the conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality and oppression of non-human nature it enjoins. The alternative standpoints and perspectives of members of the inferiorised class of nature are denied legitimacy and subordinated to that of the class of humans, ultimately becoming invisible once this master standpoint becomes part of the very structure of thought.12 Such an anthropocentric framework creates a variety of serious injustices and prudential risks, making it highly ecologically irrational.13 The hierarchical value prescriptions and epistemic distortions responsible for its biased, reductive conceptualisation of nature strips the non-human natural realm of non-instrumental value, and impedes the fair and impartial treatment of its members. Similarly, anthropocentrism creates distributive injustices by restricting ethical concern to humans, admitting partisan distributive relationships with non-human nature in the forms of commodification and instrumentalisation. The prudential risks and **blindspots** created by anthropocentrism are problematic for nature and humans alike and are of especial concern within our current context of radical human dependence on an irreplaceable and increasingly degraded natural environment. These prudential risks are in large part consequences of the centric structure's promotion of illusory human disembeddedness, self-enclosure and insensitivity to the significance and survival needs of non-human nature: The logic of centrism naturalises an illusory order in which the centre appears to itself to be disembedded, and this is especially dangerous in contexts where there is real and radical dependency on an Other who is simultaneously weakened by the application of that logic.14 Within the context of human-nature relationships, such a logic must inevitably lead to failure, either through the catastrophic extinction of our natural environment and the consequent collapse of our species, or more **hopefully** by the abandonment and transformation of the human centric framework.15

#### The alternative is to vote negative to embrace an ethic of organism.

Henning’9 (Brian, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Gonzaga University in Spokane, WA. Henning is author of the award winning book The Ethics of Creativity: Beauty, Morality and Nature in a Processive Cosmos. His current scholarship and teaching focus on the interconnections among ethics, metaphysics, and aesthetics, especially as they relate to the ethics of global climate change. E-mail: [henning@gonzaga.edu](mailto:henning@gonzaga.edu), “Trusting in the 'Efficacy of Beauty': A Kalocentric Approach to Moral Philosophy,” MUSE, AM)

Final truths (whether in religion, morality, or science) are unattainable not only due to the finitude and fallibility of human inquirers, but because we live in what the theologian John F. Haught calls an "unfinished universe" (2004). The notion that one could achieve anything like a final or absolute formulation in any field of study presupposes that one's object is static. Thankfully, we do not live in such a universe. Over the last century scientists have consistently discovered that the universe is not a plenum of lifeless, valueless facts mechanistically determined by absolute laws. Rather, we live in a processive cosmos that is a dynamic field of events organized in complex webs of interdependence, rather than a collection of objects interacting via physical laws. The intuition that the universe is fundamentally a clockwork machine successfully guided science in the wake of Newton's inspirational formulation of the laws of mechanics, but this metaphor proved increasingly inadequate as Newton's work was supplanted in the early 20th century by both general relativity and quantum mechanics. Even at its peak, the mechanical metaphor created difficulties for thinking about human beings, who were never effectively illuminated by the assumption that they were complex machines. At the level of elementary particles, quantum mechanics disclosed a world of wave-like particles spread out in space and inextricably entangled with other particles in the local environment. The notion of autonomous "individual" particles disappeared. Although all metaphors are misleading to some degree, the metaphor of the world as an evolving organism has become more helpful than the old mechanical model of the world as a clock. This, in a sense, is the founding insight of Whitehead's "philosophy of organism," which took as its starting point the view that individuals—particles, plants, and people—are not discrete facts walled off from each other but parts of complex and intersecting wholes. Conceived of as an organic process, every individual is inextricably intertwined and interconnected with every other. The fundamental reality is no longer individual entities but rather the ongoing processes by which they interact and create novel structures. Once we recognize that every individual—from a subatomic event to a majestic sequoia—brings together the diverse elements in its world in just this way, just here, and just now, we see that nothing is entirely devoid of value and beauty. This process whereby many diverse individuals are brought together into the unity of one new individual, which will eventually add its energy to future individuals, characterizes the most basic feature of reality and is what Whitehead calls the "category of creativity." On this view, reality is best characterized not as an unending march of vacuous facts, but as an incessant "creative advance" striving toward ever-richer forms of beauty and value. Noting its emphasis on interdependence and interrelation, many scholars have rightly noted that Whitehead's metaphysics is uniquely suited to provide a basis for making sense of our relationship to the natural world.10 Decades before modern ecologists taught us about ecosystems, Whitehead was describing individuals as interrelated societies of societies. No individual, Whitehead insisted, can be understood apart from its relationship to others.11 Indeed, whereas ecologists only explain how it is that macroscopic individuals are related in interdependent systems, Whitehead's organic metaphysics of process provides a rich account of how individuals at every level of complexity—from subatomic events to ecosystems, and from oak trees to galaxies—arise and are perpetuated.12What is more, Whitehead's philosophy of organism places a premium on an individual's dependence on and relationship to the larger wholes of which it is a part without making the mistake of subsuming the individual into that larger whole.13 With the philosophy of organism we need not choose between either the one or the many, "the many become one and are increased by one" (Whitehead [1929] 1978, 21). By providing a robust alternative to the various forms of reductive physicalism and destructive dualism that currently dominate many branches of science and philosophy, the philosophy of organism is an ideal position from which to address the complex social and ecological challenges confronting us. First, if who and what I am is intimately and inextricably linked to everyone and everything else in the universe, then I begin to recognize that my own flourishing and the flourishing of others are not independent. Not only do I intimately and unavoidably depend on others in order to sustain myself, with varying degrees of relevance, **how I relate to my environment is constitutive of who and what I am.** As we are quickly learning, **we ignore our interdependence with our wider environment at our own peril**. Moreover, in helping us to recognizing our connection to and dependence on our larger environment, an organic model forces us to abandon the various dualisms that have for too long allowed us to maintain the illusion that we are set off from the rest of nature. Adopting an organic metaphysics of process forces us finally to step down from the self-constructed pedestal from which we have for millennia surveyed nature and finally to embrace the lesson so compellingly demonstrated by Darwin: humans are not a singular exception to, but rather a grand exemplification of, the processes at work in the universe.14 In this way we ought finally to reject not only the materialisms of contemporary science, but also the dualisms that often undergird our religious, social, political, and moral understandings of ourselves and our relationship to the natural world. As John Dewey concisely put it, "man is within nature, not a little god outside" (1929, 351). Until we shed our self-deluding arrogance and recognize that who and what we are as a species is fundamentally bound up in and dependent on the wider scope of events unfolding in the universe, **the ecological crisis will only deepen**. Taken seriously, our understanding of reality as composed of vibrant, organically interconnected achievements of beauty and value, has a dramatic effect on how we conceiveof ourselves, of nature, and of our moral obligations—morality can no longer be limited merely to inter-human relations. In rejecting modernity's notion of lifeless matter, we come to recognize that every form of actuality has value in and for itself, for others, and for the whole. In aiming at and achieving an end for itself, every individual—no matter how ephemeral or seemingly insignificant—has intrinsic value for itself and in achieving this self-value it thereby becomes a value for others and for the whole of reality. Every individual, from the most fleeting event in deep space to centuries old redwoods, has value for itself, for others, and for the whole of reality and it is from this character of reality that our moral obligations derive (Whitehead 1938, 111). Given that every individual in our universe, no matter how small or seemingly insignificant, has some degree of value, the scope of our direct moral concern15 can exclude nothing. Thus, in rather **sharp contrast** to the invidious forms of anthropocentrism that characterize much of western moral thought, our scope of direct moral concern cannot be limited to humans, to sentient beings, or even to all living beings. Morality is not anthropocentric, but neither is it sentientcentric or biocentric. In affirming the value of **every individual,** we must begin to recognize that every relation is potentially a moral relation. As Whitehead vividly puts it, "The destruction of a man, or of an insect, or of a tree, or of the Parthenon, may be moral or immoral.… Whether we destroy or whether we preserve, our action is moral if we have thereby safeguarded the importance [or value] of experience so far as it depends on that concrete instance in the world's history" (1938, 14–15). Morality is not merely about how we ought to act toward and among other human beings, other sentient beings, or even other living beings. **Morality is fundamentally about how we comport ourselves in the world, how we relate to and interact with every form of existence**. To summarize our position thus far, in recognizing the fallibility of human knowers and the dynamic nature of the known, a Whiteheadian approach insists that moral philosophers steadfastly recognize the limits of moral inquiry, carefully navigating between the rocks of dogmatic absolutism and gross relativism. The recognition of nature's dynamism furthermore requires that philosophers abandon finally the artificial bifurcations (dualisms) and unjustified reductions (physicalism and materialism) that distort and destroy the interdependent relationships constituting reality. The world revealed by the last century of scientific investigation can no longer support a mechanistic model that describes the natural world in terms of vacuous facts determined by absolute laws. In its place, I am defending the adoption of an organic model that conceives of reality as vibrant, open, and processive. On this model, individuals are conceived of as ongoing events situated in vast webs of interdependence, each achieving value for themselves, for others, and for the whole of reality.

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#### Hardline against Cuba now – terror list

Kasperowicz ’13 – Pete, Staff Writer for the Hill, “State keeps Cuba on terror sponsors list”, 5/30, http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/americas/302609-cuba-remains-a-state-sponsor-of-terror-despite-some-improvements

As expected, the State Department on Thursday released a report that keeps Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, even as it acknowledged that some conditions on the island were improving.

State's Country Reports on Terrorism for 2012 was widely expected to keep Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria on the list of countries that sponsor terrorism, despite some reports that incorrectly suggested that it might be used by Secretary of State John Kerry to shift policy on Cuba.

In the case of Cuba, State listed three primary reasons for keeping the island nation on the list. First, it noted that Cuba continued to provide a safe haven for about two dozens members of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), a group charged with terrorism in Spain.

State's report, though, seemed to give Cuba some credit for hosting peace talks between the government of Colombia and members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The report notes that Cuba offered aid to FARC members "in past years," and indicates that Havana is no longer supporting the rebel group.

A second major reason for listing Cuba was that the government "continued to harbor fugitives wanted in the United States." That language is unchanged from last year's report.

And thirdly, State said Cuba has deficiencies in the area of anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism, just as it did in last year’s report. This year, however, State also noted that Cuba has become a member of the Financial Action Task Force of South America, which requires Havana to adopt anti-money laundering recommendations.

But still, this improvement and the hosting of peace talks between FARC and Colombia were not enough to remove Cuba from the list.

#### Lifting the embargo is appeasement – emboldens adversaries and turns case

Brookes ‘9 – Peter, Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense, “KEEP THE EMBARGO, O”, April 15, <http://nypost.com/2009/04/15/keep-the-embargo-o/>

IN another outreach to roguish regimes, the Obama administration on Monday announced the easing of some restrictions on Cuba.

Team Bam hopes that a new face in the White House will heal old wounds. Fat chance.

Sure, it’s fine to allow separated families to see each other more than once every three years — even though Cubanos aren’t allowed to visit America.

And permitting gifts to Cuban relatives could ease unnecessary poverty — even though the regime will siphon off an estimated 20 percent of the money sent there.

In the end, though, it’s still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who’ll decide whether there’ll be a thaw in ties with the United States — or not.

And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift.

Instead, and predictably, Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) — without any promises of change for the people who labor under the regime’s hard-line policies.

So much for the theory that if we’re nice to them, they’ll be nice to us.

Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang.

Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with — without any concessions on Cuba’s part, of course.

Lifting the embargo won’t normalize relations, but instead legitimize — and wave the white flag to — Fidel’s 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left.

Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers — allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad.

The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that’ll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already.

The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties — no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association.

Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won’t live in.

We also don’t need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean — or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)

With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere.

The embargo has stifled Havana’s ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time.

Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn’t free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers.

The US embargo remains a matter of principle — and an appropriate response to Cuba’s brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven’t we learned that yet?

Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

#### Obama’s credibility is uniquely key to solve conflict – prevents Indo-Pak war

Coes ’11 – Ben, former speechwriter in the George H.W. Bush administration, managed Mitt Romney’s successful campaign for Massachusetts Governor in 2002, “The disease of a weak president”, 9/30, http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/

The attention of the world has been riveted to Israel, Palestine and Iran in light of the Palestinians’ decision to seek U.N. recognition and Ahmadinejad’s visit to New York City to once again rub America’s nose in his war-mongering, Holocaust denials and 9/11 conspiracy theories.

Unfortunately, President Obama’s weakness in his response to Israel and Iran is a cause for real concern, not only for our Israeli allies, but for other American allies as well. A weak U.S. president emboldens our enemies. A good example of this is what happened the last time we had a weak president, namely Jimmy Carter.

The disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles’ heel all politicians are born with — the desire to be popular. It leads to pandering to different audiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately results in that very politician losing the trust and respect of friends and foes alike.

In the case of Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least take comfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to protect itself from potential threats from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States, in both word and deed, the fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of ways. Despite this, I wouldn’t bet against the soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces.

But Obama’s weakness could — in other places — have implications far, far worse than anything that might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular plot of land that connects Pakistan, India and China is held together with much more fragility and is built upon a truly foreboding foundation of religious hatreds, radicalism, resource envy and nuclear weapons.

If you can only worry about preventing one foreign policy disaster, worry about this one.

Here are a few unsettling facts to think about:

First, Pakistan and India have fought three wars since the British de-colonized and left the region in 1947. All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now possess hundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map many times over.

Second, Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when — not if — Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president. Make no mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a far greater concern than Ali Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a single nuclear device.

Third, China sits at the northern border of both India and Pakistan. China is strategically aligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China covets India’s natural resources. Over the years, it has slowly inched its way into the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land and resources and drawing little notice from the outside world.

In my book, Coup D’Etat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a radical Islamist who then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear weapons to the theater, America steps in and removes the Pakistani leader through a coup d’état.

I wish it was that simple.

The more complicated and difficult truth is that we, as Americans, must take sides. We must be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be ready and willing to threaten our military might on behalf of our allies. And our allies are Israel and India.

There are many threats out there — Islamic radicalism, Chinese technology espionage, global debt and half a dozen other things that smarter people than me are no doubt worrying about. But the single greatest threat to America is none of these. The single greatest threat facing America and our allies is a weak U.S. president. It doesn’t have to be this way. President Obama could — if he chose — develop a backbone and lead. Alternatively, America could elect a new president. It has to be one or the other. The status quo is simply not an option.

#### Indo-Pak war escalates quickly to extinction – no checks

Chaffin ’11 – Greg, Research Assistant at Foreign Policy in Focus, “Reorienting U.S. Security Strategy in South Asia”, July 8, http://fpif.org/reorienting\_us\_security\_strategy\_in\_south\_asia/

The greatest threat to regional security (although curiously not at the top of most lists of U.S. regional concerns) is the possibility that increased India-Pakistan tension will erupt into all-out war that could quickly escalate into a nuclear exchange. Indeed, in just the past two decades, the two neighbors have come perilously close to war on several occasions. India and Pakistan remain the most likely belligerents in the world to engage in nuclear war.

Due to an Indian preponderance of conventional forces, Pakistan would have a strong incentive to use its nuclear arsenal very early on before a routing of its military installations and weaker conventional forces. In the event of conflict, Pakistan’s only chance of survival would be the early use of its nuclear arsenal to inflict unacceptable damage to Indian military and (much more likely) civilian targets. By raising the stakes to unacceptable levels, Pakistan would hope that India would step away from the brink. However, it is equally likely that India would respond in kind, with escalation ensuing. Neither state possesses tactical nuclear weapons, but both possess scores of city-sized bombs like those used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Furthermore, as more damage was inflicted (or as the result of a decapitating strike), command and control elements would be disabled, leaving individual commanders to respond in an environment increasingly clouded by the fog of war and decreasing the likelihood that either government (what would be left of them) would be able to guarantee that their forces would follow a negotiated settlement or phased reduction in hostilities. As a result any such conflict would likely continue to escalate until one side incurred an unacceptable or wholly debilitating level of injury or exhausted its nuclear arsenal.

A nuclear conflict in the subcontinent would have disastrous effects on the world as a whole. In a January 2010 paper published in Scientific American, climatology professors Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon forecast the global repercussions of a regional nuclear war. Their results are strikingly similar to those of studies conducted in 1980 that conclude that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would result in a catastrophic and prolonged nuclear winter, which could very well place the survival of the human race in jeopardy. In their study, Robock and Toon use computer models to simulate the effect of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each were to use roughly half their existing arsenals (50 apiece). Since Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices are strategic rather than tactical, the likely targets would be major population centers. Owing to the population densities of urban centers in both nations, the number of direct casualties could climb as high as 20 million.

The fallout of such an exchange would not merely be limited to the immediate area. First, the detonation of a large number of nuclear devices would propel as much as seven million metric tons of ash, soot, smoke, and debris as high as the lower stratosphere. Owing to their small size (less than a tenth of a micron) and a lack of precipitation at this altitude, ash particles would remain aloft for as long as a decade, during which time the world would remain perpetually overcast. Furthermore, these particles would soak up heat from the sun, generating intense heat in the upper atmosphere that would severely damage the earth’s ozone layer. The inability of sunlight to penetrate through the smoke and dust would lead to global cooling by as much as 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit. This shift in global temperature would lead to more drought, worldwide food shortages, and widespread political upheaval.

Although the likelihood of this doomsday scenario remains relatively low, the consequences are dire enough to warrant greater U.S. and international attention. Furthermore, due to the ongoing conflict over Kashmir and the deep animus held between India and Pakistan, it might not take much to set them off. Indeed, following the successful U.S. raid on bin Laden’s compound, several members of India’s security apparatus along with conservative politicians have argued that India should emulate the SEAL Team Six raid and launch their own cross-border incursions to nab or kill anti-Indian terrorists, either preemptively or after the fact. Such provocative action could very well lead to all-out war between the two that could quickly escalate.

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#### Castro is actively strengthening economic ties with China

WSJ ’12 – Wall Street Journal; “Cuba Seeks Closer Ties With Beijing”; July 5, 2012; <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303684004577508432963724246>

BEIJING—Cuban President Raúl Castro is looking to strengthen the country's economic ties to Beijing as it moves to liberalize its economy somewhat and limit its energy dependence on Venezuela, whose leader is battling cancer and faces a tough election at home.

Mr. Castro landed in Beijing on Wednesday to meet with China's top leaders before heading out to Vietnam on Saturday, touring onetime Communist fellow travelers that have revamped their economies. On Thursday, Cuban representatives signed economic, technology and agricultural agreements with Chinese officials, though few specifics were disclosed.

"Currently relations are maturing with each passing day," Mr. Castro said Thursday in an appearance with China President Hu Jintao. "The relationship has passed the test of time."

Since 2011, Cuba has begun encouraging the formation of private enterprises, permitting property and automobile sales, and reducing the role of the state in agriculture. Still, the Cuban economy grew less than 3% in 2011, nowhere near the pace of Asian nations.

Chinese technocrats and academics are working on a dozen projects to help remake the Cuban economy, including infrastructure, transportation and energy, said Xu Shicheng, a Cuba expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. While Cuba has made progress, "most importantly, there is a need to update the people's mentality," he said. "Many people in Cuba think that updating the private sector means adopting capitalism. It will take Cuba a long time to accomplish what China did."

Mr. Castro's visit comes as China tries to be a major player in Latin American affairs. Already, China is a major destination for commodities from Brazil and Argentina, and is boosting investment in the region, especially in energy projects.

Beijing also has long been involved in a tug of war with Taiwan over diplomatic recognition by Central American and Caribbean countries, which play off Taipei against Beijing.

Cuba is a nation of just 11 million people but it has long been a foreign-affairs flash point because of the charismatic leadership of former President Fidel Castro and its struggles against the U.S. There are about 1.5 million Cuban-Americans, many of whom live in Florida and other politically important states.

Havana has relied on exports of oil from its closest ally, Venezuela, headed by President Hugo Chávez, who also had pledged in 2007 to help Cuba build or expand its refining capacity. But Venezuela didn't follow through, and after the global financial crisis, China stepped in. State-controlled China National Petroleum Corp. signed a $4.5 billion deal last year to upgrade Cuba's Cienfuegos refinery.

Havana also needs help in exploring for oil offshore, especially in the Gulf of Mexico. The U.S. Energy Information Administration says that drilling in the area thus far has been "quite limited."

"Cuba needs to try to manage what happens if there is a change in government in Caracas tomorrow, either by the death of Chávez or by Chávez losing the election," said Jorge Piñon, a researcher at the University of Texas at Austin. "I personally believe that China would make an important long-term strategic partner for Cuba, particularly after a possible economic and political vacuum left by a change of administration in Caracas and even after a post-embargo scenario."

Cuba and China have had a complicated relationship since China started to open its economy to outside investment in 1978, to veer sharply from communist orthodoxy and to increasingly court the U.S.

Fidel Castro stridently opposed reform that smacked of capitalism, and continued to see the U.S. as an enemy—a view that was largely reciprocated in Washington. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and cut off subsidized oil shipments to Cuba, Mr. Castro resented China, say Cuba watchers, because China did little to fill the void.

Fidel Castro's brother Raúl, who was then defense minister, was seen as more open to market-oriented changes. In 2003, he invited China's then-premier, Zhu Rongji, who played a leading role in opening up China to foreign trade and investment, to give a series of lectures in Cuba. Fidel Castro was a no-show, said Domingo Amuchastegui, a former Cuban intelligence officer.

But Raúl Castro was hardly a closet capitalist. In 2008, when Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Cuba, according to news reports, Raúl serenaded him with a rendition of the Chinese standard "The East Is Red," a Chinese favorite during the Mao era.

Under Fidel Castro, Cuba grew more reliant on oil-rich Venezuela. But after Mr. Castro became seriously ill in 2006, he temporarily ceded power to his brother, who then formally became president in 2008. When the Cuban government formally approved economic reforms last year, Fidel Castro was in attendance, which was seen as giving his blessing to the changes. Fidel Castro, now 85 years old, writes newspaper columns, but avoids domestic economic issues, said Mr. Xu, the Chinese analyst.

For his part, Mr. Chávez is struggling with cancer and faces a tough presidential election in October.

The 81-year-old Raúl Castro has further cemented ties to China. In June 2011, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping, who is expected to take China's top positions in the government and Communist Party by next year, visited Havana. The two countries have been working on projects in oil exploration, hotel construction, biotechnology and infrastructure.

"The big picture is that Cuba is still trying to get used to the idea of the 'new China,' which Fidel has long detested and Raúl finds, well, intriguing," says Harvard University professor Jorge Domínguez, a Cuba expert.

This is Raúl Castro's third trip to China since 1997, said Mr. Xu, the Chinese expert. "What's different this time is his status. He is visiting as the No. 1 leader."

#### Engaging Cuba sends a signal the US has new intentions on Latin America—increases relations and influence in the region

IAD ‘9 (“A Second Chance: US Policy in the Americas,” Inter-American Dialogue; http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/A%20Second%20Chance,%20FINAL%20to%20post.pdf)

Cuba is not, in itself, an urgent concern for the United States . But there is no other issue on which Washington is so out of step with the rest of the region . Nothing would better demonstrate the new administration’s intention to pursue a fresh approach to Latin America than making a quick start to dismantle the web of restrictions that the United States has imposed on Cuba . A policy shift on cuba, which carries great symbolic weight in the region, would be a powerful signal that Washington will be more responsive to Latin American views . The Cuban American community, which has effectively blocked any easing of U .S .Cuba policy to date, is politically weaker and more diverse than it once was . Still, it will have considerable influence in shaping the U .S . approach to the island, and its views will have to be taken into account . That is why the Obama administration should start, as it has promised, by scrapping the barriers to family travel and remittance transfers to Cuba

#### Engagement is zero-sum

Dowd ‘12

Alan Dowd, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, 2012, “Crisis in the America's,” <http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas>

Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it’s time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile—border the Pacific. Given Beijing’s actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.¶ Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine.¶ Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes China’s efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of control—implied or explicit—by China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere.¶ In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

#### Chinese influence in Latin America key to the global economy

Ellis 11

R. Evan, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University.Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, 1st quarter 2011, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf>

Access to Latin American Markets. Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call President Chávez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, China has applied more explicit pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14 China has also used its economic weight to help secure major projects on preferential terms. In the course of negotiating a $1.7 billion loan deal for the Coco Coda Sinclair Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to self-finance 85 percent of the projects through Chinese banks helped it to work around the traditional Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a local partner. Later, the Ecuadorian government publicly and bitterly broke off negotiations with the Chinese, only to return to the bargaining table 2 months later after failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the Chávez government agreed, for example, to accept half of the $20 billion loaned to it by the PRC in Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the Chinese manufacturer Haier for resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC loaned Venezuela $300 million to start a regional airline, but as part of the deal, required Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.15 Protection of Chinese Nationals. As with the United States and other Western countries, as China becomes more involved in business and other operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationals will be vulnerable to hazards common to the region, such as kidnapping, crime, protests, and related problems. The heightened presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador, for example, has been associated with a series of problems, including the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November 2006, and protests in Orellana related to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35 police officers and forced the declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela, became the focus of violent protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase, the PRC will need to rely increasingly on a combination of goodwill and fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its influence with governments of the region, to resolve such problems when they occur.The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country’s sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China’s attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used “against” Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.

#### Nuclear war

Harris and Burrows ‘9

(Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>, AM)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

## off

#### Farm bill will pass—key legislators are working out food stamp differences

Politico 11/20 – “Farm bill talks intensify”, David Rogers, 11/20/13, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/11/food-stamp-costs-farm-bill-100158.html

Farm bill talks intensified Wednesday night even as a new report showed that food stamp expenditures are already beginning to fall as a share of the economy — a downward decline that’s expected to accelerate over the next five years.

Further cuts from food stamps are a major dividing point in the farm bill negotiations now, but there is growing pressure to try to reach a deal in the next few days on both the nutrition and commodity titles.

The top four members of the House and Senate Agriculture Committees met for almost 90 minutes Wednesday evening behind closed doors with staff. Further discussions are expected Thursday morning, and House Chairman Frank Lucas (R-Okla.) held out the possibility of more meetings Friday depending on what progress is being made.

“It was a good discussion. …We’re not there yet,” Lucas told reporters. “It’s complicated and we’re making progress,” echoed his Senate counterpart, Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow (D-Mich.).

Most telling, perhaps, Minnesota Rep. Collin Peterson, the ranking Democrat on the House panel and the chairman during the last farm bill, sounded a more upbeat note than he has of late. Asked if a deal were possible this week, Peterson said, “I think it is.”

Wednesday’s report, authored by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, tracks the rapid rise of food stamp costs during the recession but also points toward evidence already of a downward slope as the economy improves.

The final numbers for fiscal 2013, which ended Sept. 30, show a modest downward drop. Outlays for October — the first month of fiscal 2014 — were about 5.5 percent below those for October 2012, a year ago. And November ushered in a 7 percent benefit cut as the Agriculture Department began to roll back increases enacted in 2009 as part of President Barack Obama’s stimulus program.

As a result, outlays for 2014 are expected to fall to $78.5 billion compared to $82.5 billion in 2013. And the Center projects that by 2018, food stamp costs will be down to 0.36 percent of the economy as measured by the gross domestic product.

That would be the lowest percentage since Obama won election in 2008 amid the financial collapse. And it represents an almost one-third reduction from the high of 0.52 percent in recent years.

Nonetheless, the dramatic growth in spending for food stamps, formally titled the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, makes it a major issue in the debate over a new farm bill — the first since the recession.

House Republicans are proposing nearly $40 billion in savings over the next decade — roughly 10 times what the Democratic Senate has supported. And the slow pace of the talks is becoming a worry for the Republican leadership.

Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) had been banking on putting the farm bill debate behind him this year, with passage of a conference report before the House goes home for Christmas in mid-December.

Lucas badly wants the framework of a deal this week and is pressing the Senate to move to at least $10 billion in savings. There are several options for achieving this without dramatic harm to the program. And to win over Democrats, a portion of the savings could be reinvested in employment and training grants to states — a priority for governors of both parties.

Nonetheless, the task has gotten far harder after the rollback in benefits this month.

This cut had been long scheduled and was inevitably part of the calculus when Obama first increased benefits temporarily to boost the economy. But the timing could not be worse for the farm bill. And Stabenow has been insisting that the multiyear savings of $11 billion should be counted with the $4 billion already in her bill.

An added hindrance is the fact that Peterson has been preoccupied with an entirely separate battle with Boehner over dairy provisions in the farm bill. As a former chairman and veteran political player, the Minnesota Democrat is an ally Lucas needs to work a deal with Democrats on food stamps. And to the extent Peterson has been so focused on dairy, it appears to have slowed progress in the talks.

The Center, a progressive nonprofit based in Washington, is respected for its own expertise regarding food stamps. And apart from the new data, the economic analysis provides some context for the fight.

“Once the economy has fully recovered, SNAP costs are expected to rise only in response to growth in the size of the low-income population and increases in food prices,” the report says. “Unlike health care programs and Social Security, there are no demographic or programmatic pressures that will cause SNAP costs to grow faster than the overall economy. Thus, SNAP is not contributing to the nation’s long-term fiscal problems.”

#### PC is key – overcomes partisanship

Josh Lederman 10/18/13, reporter for the Associated Press, and Jim Kuhnhenn, “No safe bets for Obama despite toned-down agenda,” US News and World Report, http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2013/10/18/no-safe-bets-for-obama-despite-toned-down-agenda

WASHINGTON (AP) — Regrouping after a feud with Congress stalled his agenda, President Barack Obama is laying down a three-item to-do list for Congress that seems meager when compared with the bold, progressive agenda he envisioned at the start of his second term.¶ But given the capital's partisanship, the complexities of the issues and the limited time left, even those items — immigration, farm legislation and a budget — amount to ambitious goals that will take political muscle, skill and ever-elusive compromise to execute.¶ "Those are three specific things that would make a huge difference in our economy right now," Obama said. "And we could get them done by the end of the year if our focus is on what's good for the American people."

#### Plan drains capital—anti-Cuba lobby means a sudden reconciliation with Havana sparks fights

Birns and Mills 13 (Larry, Director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Frederick B., COHA Senior Research Fellow, 01/30, “Best Time for U.S.–Cuba Rapprochement Is Now,” http://www.coha.org/best-time-for-u-s-cuba-rapprochement-is-now/)

Despite the basic intransigence of US policy towards Cuba, in recent years, important changes have been introduced by Havana: state control over the economy has been diminished; most travel restrictions affecting both Americans and Cubans on the island have been lifted; and the “group of 75” Cuban dissidents detained in 2003 have been freed. Washington has all but ignored these positive changes by Havana, but when it comes to interacting with old foes such as those of Myanmar, North Korea, and Somalia, somehow constructive dialogue is the order of the day. One reason for this inconsistency is the continued opposition by the anti-Castro lobby to a change of course by Washington. The anti-Castro lobby and their allies in the US Congress argue that the reforms coming out of Havana are too little too late and that political repression continues unabated. They continue to see the embargo as a tool for coercing either more dramatic reforms or regime change. It is true that the reformist tendency in Cuba does not include a qualitative move from a one party system to political pluralism. Lamentably, Cuba reportedly continues to use temporary detentions and the occasional jailing of non-violent dissidents to limit the parameters of political debate and total freedom of association. The authors agree that no non-violent Cuban dissident should be intimidated, detained or jailed. But continuing to maliciously turn the screws on Havana has never provided an incentive for more democracy in any sense of the word nor has it created a political opening into which Cuba, with confidence, could enter. The easing of tensions between Washington and Havana is more likely to contribute to the evolution of a more democratic form of socialism on the island, the early stages of which we may presently be witnessing. In any case the precise form of such change inevitably should and will be decided in Cuba, not in Washington or Miami. To further moves towards rapprochement with Cuba, the U.S. State Department should remove the country from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. It is an invention to depict Havana as a state sponsor of terrorism, a charge only levied by the State Department under pressure from Hill hardliners. As researcher Kevin Edmunds, quite properly points out: “This position is highly problematic, as the United States has actively engaged in over 50 years of economic and covert destabilization in Cuba, going so far as blindly protecting wanted terrorists such as Luis Posada Carilles and Orlando Bosch, both former CIA agents accused of dozens of terrorist attacks in Cuba and the United States ” (Nov. 15, 2012, Kevin Edmonds blog). It was precisely the propensity of some anti-Castro extremists to plan terrorist attacks against Cuba that urgently motivated the infiltration of such groups by the Cuban five as well as the close monitoring of these organizations by the FBI. Another gesture of good will would be for the White House to grant clemency to the Cuban five: Gerardo Hernandez, Ramón Labañino, Fernando Gonzalez, Antonio Guerrero and René Gonzalez. They are Cuban nationals who were convicted in a Miami court in 2001 and subsequently sentenced to terms ranging from 15 years to double life, mostly on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage. Despite requests for a change of venue out of Miami, which at first was granted and later denied, the trial took place in a politically charged Miami atmosphere that arguably tainted the proceedings and compromised justice. Supporters maintain that the Cuban five had infiltrated extremist anti-Castro organizations in order to prevent terrorist attacks against Cuba and did not pose any security threat to the United States. It would be an important humanitarian gesture to let them go home. Perhaps such a gesture might facilitate reciprocity on the part of Cuban authorities when it comes to American engineer Alan Gross who is presently being detained in a Cuban jail. There would probably be a political price to pay by the Obama administration for taking steps towards reconciliation with Havana, but if Obama’s election to a second term means that there is to be a progressive dividend, surely such a dividend ought to include a change in US policy towards the island. Mirabile dictu, the Administration can build on the small steps it has already taken. Since 2009, Washington has lifted some of the restrictions on travel between the US and Cuba and now allows Cuban Americans to send remittances to relatives on the island. The Cuba Reconciliation Act (HR 214) introduced by Representative Jose Serrano (D-NY) on January 4, 2013, and sitting in a number of congressional committees, would repeal the harsh terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, both of which toughened the embargo during the special period in Cuba. The Cuba Reconciliation Act, however, is unlikely to get much traction, especially with ultra-hardliner Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), chairing the House Foreign Relations Committee, and her counterpart, Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who is about to lead the Senate Foreign Relations Body. Some of the anti-Castro Cuban American community would likely view any of the three measures advocated here as a capitulation to the Castro brothers. But as we have argued, a pro-democracy and humanist position is not in any way undermined, but might in fact be advanced by détente. An end to the embargo has been long overdue, and the judgment of history may very well be that it ought never to have been started.

#### New farm bill key to prevent a food price spike

Nelson 10/17/13 [Joe Nelson, writer for WEAU news, “Obama, ag industry waiting for new Farm bill,” <http://www.weau.com/home/headlines/Obama-ag-industry-waiting-for-new-Farm-Bill-228259521.html>]

With the government shutdown over, farmers are still waiting for a deal to be made.¶ President Obama listed the farm bill as one of his top priorities to address, which could protect farmers and low income families.¶ “We should pass a farm bill, one that American farmers and ranchers can depend on, one that protects vulnerable children and adults in times of need, one that gives rural communities opportunities to grow and the long-term certainty that they deserve. Again, the Senate's already passed a solid bipartisan bill. It's got support from democrats and republicans. It's sitting in the House waiting for passage. If House republicans have ideas that they think would improve the farm bill, let's see them. Let's negotiate. What are we waiting for? Let's get this done,” Obama said.¶ Farmers said if they struggle without a farm bill, it could cause food prices to spike, force some out of the industry and damage the economy.¶ “If the milk price falls below a certain level, the Farm bill does help support farmers during a time of an economic crisis when prices drop too low,” Chippewa County U.W. Extension Crops and Soils Educator, Jerry Clark¶ The current, five-year Farm bill was temporarily extended, but both farmers and Clark said with much to lose, a new one is needed.¶ “Any time we can get the new bill passed, it's definitely going to help because there's always new changes in agriculture, as far as commodities or practices that need to be implemented,” Clark said. “So those types of things should be passed to keep up with the current trends in agriculture.¶ Durand corn and soybean farmer and Value Implement dealer TJ Poeschel says not having a new farm bill and reverting to a bill from 1949 could cut down profits or even force some farmers to quit or retire.

#### Extinction

Brown 9 (Lester R, Founder of the Worldwatch Institute and the Earth Policy Institute “Can Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” Scientific American, May, <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=civilization-food-shortages>)

The biggest threat to global stability is the potential for food crises in poor countries to cause government collapse. Those crises are brought on by ever worsening environmental degradation¶ One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change. Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well. But sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today's economic crisis.¶ For most of us, the idea that civilization itself could disintegrate probably seems preposterous. Who would not find it hard to think seriously about such a complete departure from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire--and how would we go about responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos--and Earth might collide with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Yet I, too, have resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global civilization.¶ I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy--most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures--forces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible. The Problem of Failed States Even a cursory look at the vital signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental decline without seeing any significant effort to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and summer of last year climbed to the highest level ever.As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever increasing rate. We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk.States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy.Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere. Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six).Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases--such as polio, SARS or avian flu--breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself.

## Neolib

#### Sugarcane isn’t sustainable – no investment or commitment

Soligo & Jaffe ‘10**–** Rice Scholar at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University AND Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies at Rice University (Ronald AND Amy Myers, Cuba's Energy Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 102-103)

Issues in Achieving Cuba’s Ethanol Potential As noted, estimates of Cuba’s ethanol potential will depend on assumptions about the amount of sugarcane that can be planted and harvested, as well as what sugarcane yields can be achieved. More ambitious assumptions will yield higher outputs. For example, Juan Sanchez assumes that Cuba could devote 2 million hectares to sugarcane with yields of 80 tons per hectare and 83.6 liters per ton (6,688 liters per hectare). He projects ethanol output at 13.4 billion liters, or 3.5 billion gallons. 47¶ Three and a half billion gallons seems unrealistic for the foreseeable future. There is some question as to whether Cuba could ever again attain the 1.5 million hectares of sugarcane harvested in 1970, let alone 2 million. According to Brian Pollitt, the 1970 harvest was achieved only by cutting cane that would normally be left to mature for another season in order to produce a higher sugar yield in the following year. 48 Obviously this is not a sustainable practice if optimal yields are to be achieved. ¶ Two billion gallons can be produced with a harvested area of 1.33 million hectares and a yield of seventy-five tons per hectare. That area of cultivation is not too far from the average harvest of 1.28 million hectares that Cuba was able to maintain during the 1970s and 1980s. Yet reaching 1.33 million hectares will require time and substantial investment in farm machinery and restoration of the land, which has been neglected and compacted by the use of heavy Soviet-built harvesting machinery. The land will also have to be tilled and newly planted with sugarcane. ¶ Achieving higher sugarcane yields will also require time and investments to acquire or develop higher-yielding sugarcane varieties. Cuban yields averaged only fifty-eight tons per hectare during the 1970s and 1980s, substantially below the seventy-five tons per hectare needed to produce 2 billion gallons of ethanol. Yet other countries, as noted, have achieved or exceeded that yield, and some private Cuban farmers are reported to have achieved even higher yields of 100 tons per acre. 49 Yields, of course, are a function of other factors besides cane variety. The condition of the land, access to water and fertilizer, and other inputs would all need to be considered. ¶ Finally, Cuba will have to undertake significant investments in distilleries, transport, storage, and distribution infrastructure if it wants to produce the levels of ethanol that the authors believe are achievable. Investment costs for the biorefineries alone will come to billions of dollars. For example, in 2006, corn-based ethanol plants in the United States cost roughly $1.88 per gallon for a capacity of 48 million gallons per year, and $1.50 per gallon for capac- ity of 120 million gallons per year (reflecting significant economies of scale). So even if all new plants in Cuba were built with the larger capacity, it would require $3 billion dollars (at 2006 prices) to build sufficient capacity to produce 2 billion gallons.

#### Cuba agriculture sustainable now **because of the Embargo** – plan collapses the industry

Fairweather and Asquith ’10 (Jack Fairweather- former Middle East correspondent who spent four years as the Daily Telegraph’s Baghdad and Gulf correspondent. He was an embedded reporter during the Iraq invasion, and won the British equivalent of the Pulitzer prize for his reporting on Iraq’s civil war. Most recently Jack has been the Washington Post Global’s Islamic world correspondent, where he has created Islam’s Advance, a multi-media Post webpage that’s viewed by 80,000 viewers a month. Jack is also a contributor to Harper’s Magazine, Mother Jones and the Atlantic Monthly and Christina Asquith- Christina Asquith has 12 years experience as a local beat reporter, national correspondent and foreign correspondent for The Philadelphia Inquirer, The New York Times and The Economist. She spent three years in the Middle East covering the Iraq war, and won “Educator of the Year” award by Education News for her coverage of the effects of war on the lives of school system. She also is author of two non-fiction books: “The Emergency Teacher: A Year Inside Philadelphia’s Toughest School” (Skyhorse Press, 2007) and “The Spinsters’ War: A Story of Women, Life and Death in Iraq” (Random House, 2009). Prior to joining Solutions Magazine, she was senior editor at Diverse Magazine in Washington DC; “How Can Cuba’s Sustainable Agriculture Survive the Peace?”; <http://thesolutionsjournal.com/node/554>)

For a country that responded to severe energy crisis by switching to organic, localized agriculture, the fruits of the revolution must be protected from the coming peace.¶ For those trying to imagine life without oil, Cuba has proven the solitary example of a country successfully de-industrializing.¶ Confronted with the collapse of aid from the Soviet Union and ever-tighter U.S. sanctions in the early 1990s, the Castro regime was forced to scupper its centrally-planned, fossil-fuel-driven agriculture and rediscover sustainable and green farming practices.¶ The solutions developed by a young generation of farmers and agronomists – including urban farms in vacant lots in the capital, Havana, and a network of producers across the country – now provide 80% of the country with predominantly local, organic produce and helped turn Cuba into an unintentional leader of the green movement.¶ And yet, scarcely has this revolution been achieved, but it is under threat — not from the imperial machination of America (a popular theme in Communist circles) but **from the promise of Cuba’s re-integration into the world economy**, raised by President Barack Obama at the recent Summit of the Americas.¶ The problem, say the leaders of Cuba’s green movement, is that opening up trade will flood the country with cheap oil and with it a return to an industrialized food supply. Recent subsidized oil imports from Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez have led to an increase in the use of fertilizers.¶ “Industrialized food production in Cuba means centralized planning and control. The government never wanted to give up control, and now with more oil, we may see the independence that localized, sustainable agriculture produces being undermined,” said Fernando Funes Monzote, a leading agronomist at the Indio Hatuey Experimental Station, University of Matanzas.

#### Countless structural alt causes the embargo wouldn’t solve

Suchlicki 12(JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. He is currently the Latin American Editor for Transaction Publishers and the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro (1997), now in its fourth edition, and editor with Irving L. Horowitz of Cuban Communism (1999). He is also the author of Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA (1998). He is a highly regarded consultant to both the private and public sector on Cuba and Latin American affairs “Getting Ready for Life after Castro” May 11 2012 <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/11/getting_ready_for_life_after_castro?page=0,2>)

The challenges are many. First, there will be the tremendous task of economic reconstruction. For nearly four decades, Cuba's extreme dependence on the Soviet bloc for trade, and the distorting effects of huge subsidies from Moscow, created an artificial economy. Most of Cuba's exports are in decline, and poverty is correspondingly growing. The internal market is weak, as domestic consumption is controlled by a strict and severe rationing system. Many transactions take place in the illegal black market, which operates in American dollars and with merchandise stolen from state enterprises or received from abroad. The Cuban peso has depreciated and its purchasing power has waned considerably. Huge and persistent government deficits, and the absence of virtually any stabilizing fiscal and monetary policies, have accelerated the downward spiraling of the economy. (Socio-Economic Reconstruction: Suggestions and Recommendations for Post-Castro Cuba, Antonio Jorge, and Institutions to Accompany the Market in Cuba, Ernesto Hernandez-Cata).¶ Moreover, sugar production, Cuba's mainstay export, has dropped to Great Depression levels. With low prices, a decline in sugar consumption worldwide, an increase in the number of competitive sugar producers, and widespread use of artificial sweeteners, sugar is a losing commodity with dire prospects for the future. Thus tourism, nickel exports, and even exile remittances have replaced sugar as the mainstay of the economy. Oil exploration in Cuba's northwestern waters seems promising, but profits must be shared with foreign partners, and costs are extremely high.¶ In addition to these vexing economic realities, there will be also a maze of legal problems, particularly concerning foreign investment and the status of assets acquired during the Castro era. Obviously, Cuban nationals, Cuban-Americans, and foreigners whose properties were confiscated during the early years of the revolution will want to reclaim them or will ask for fair compensation. (Property Rights in the Post-Castro Cuban Constitution, Oscar M. Garibaldi and John D. Kirby; Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Confiscated Properties in Post-Castro Cuba, Mátias F. Traviesco-Diáz.) The U.S. and other countries whose citizens' assets were seized without compensation are likely to support such demands. Cubans living abroad await the opportunity to exercise their legal claims before Cuban courts. The Eastern European and Nicaraguan examples vividly illustrate the complexities, delays, and uncertainties accompanying the reclamation process. (What Can Countries Embarking on Post-Socialist Transformation Learn from the Experiences So Far?, János Kornai).¶ Cuba's severely damaged infrastructure is in major need of rebuilding. The outdated electric grid cannot supply the needs of consumers and industry. Transportation is inadequate. Communication facilities are obsolete, and sanitary and medical facilitates have deteriorated so badly that contagious diseases constitute a real menace to the population. In addition, environmental concerns such as the pollution of bays and rivers require immediate intervention. (Environmental Concerns for a Cuba in Transition, Eudel Eduardo Cepero.)

#### Neoliberalism is key to hegemony

Cafruny ‘8

Alan, Professor of IR (“The ‘Imperial Turn’ and the Future of US Hegemony: ‘Terminal’ Decline or Retrenchment?,” All Academic)

The role played by U.S. structural financial power in the construction of Europe’s neoliberal project has been analyzed by many scholars (Helleiner, 1994; Gowan, 1999; Seabrooke, 2001; Baker, 2003); Panitch and Gindin, 2005; Cafruny and Ryner, 2007a; Ryner, 2007). However, the relationship between neoliberalism and geopolitics has received less attention. In the first part of this chapter I discuss the role of U.S. military power as it has served, in tandem with U.S. structural financial power, to consolidate the turn to neoliberalism in Europe. Beginning in the mid-1990s the United States transformed NATO from a containment-oriented and defensive alliance to an instrument designed to promote the forward expansion of American power across the European continent and into central Asia. This reinforced Europe’s geopolitical dependence on the United States and buttressed neoliberal social forces across the continent. In the second part of the chapter I consider the long-range possibilities for the United States and Europe in view of growing challenges to U.S. power in both its geoeconomic and geopolitical dimensions. The uncertain status of the dollar is the natural accompaniment to relative industrial decline and the transnationalization of production even as U.S. hegemony has been prolonged through financial deregulation and a resultant series of bubbles. In this context the Bush administration’s policy of geopolitical advance and militarization, designed in part to maintain its hold over global energy resources, is a compensatory strategy (Harvey, 2003) that has, however, encountered substantial costs and risks. Notwithstanding the deepening crisis of the U.S. imperium, the possibilities for a European challenge are sharply circumscribed by its subordinate participation within a U.S.-led neoliberal transnational financial order and its related inability to develop an autonomous regional security structure. U.S. power in both its structural financial and military dimensions has been central to the construction and consolidation of a European neoliberalism. It has not, however, led to transnational class formation or the suppression of inter-imperialist rivalry either at the Atlantic level or within the European Union. Neoliberal ideology cements national capitalist classes together in an organic alliance under a declining but still minimally hegemonic U.S. superpower. From within the framework of this intersubjective agreement the United States continues to provide collective goods in the form of liquidity, trade openness, and military security, albeit very much on its own terms as it externalizes its own problems and social contradictions into the international system. In the eurozone mercantilist rivalry has been displaced from the sphere of national monetary policy to “structural labor reform” and, intermittently, fiscal policy.

#### Hegemony solves nuclear war and dampens all conflict

Barnett ‘11

Thomas, American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads>, AM

Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, **the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known**. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would** now **be no** identifiable **human civilization left**, **once nuclear weapons entered the** killing **equation**. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-**perpetual great-power peace**. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across **two world wars**. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a **99 percent** relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.

#### No multilat - Pursuit of hegemony’s locked-in

Zach Dorfman 12, assistant editor of Ethics and International Affairs, the journal of the Carnegie Council, and co-editor of the Montreal Review, “What We Talk About When We Talk About Isolationism”, May 18, <http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=605>

The rise of China notwithstanding, the United States remains the world’s sole superpower. Its military (and, to a considerable extent, political) hegemony extends not just over North America or even the Western hemisphere, but also Europe, large swaths of Asia, and Africa. Its interests are global; nothing is outside its potential sphere of influence. There are an estimated 660 to 900 American military bases in roughly forty countries worldwide, although figures on the matter are notoriously difficult to ascertain, largely because of subterfuge on the part of the military. According to official data there are active-duty U.S. military personnel in 148 countries, or over 75 percent of the world’s states. The United States checks Russian power in Europe and Chinese power in South Korea and Japan and Iranian power in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey. In order to maintain a frigid peace between Israel and Egypt, the American government hands the former $2.7 billion in military aid every year, and the latter $1.3 billion. It also gives Pakistan more than $400 million dollars in military aid annually (not including counterinsurgency operations, which would drive the total far higher), Jordan roughly $200 million, and Colombia over $55 million. U.S. long-term military commitments are also manifold. It is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the only institution legally permitted to sanction the use of force to combat “threats to international peace and security.” In 1949 the United States helped found NATO, the first peacetime military alliance extending beyond North and South America in U.S. history, which now has twenty-eight member states. The United States also has a trilateral defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral mutual defense treaties with Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. It is this sort of reach that led Madeleine Albright to call the United States the sole “indispensible power” on the world stage. The idea that global military dominance and political hegemony is in the U.S. national interest—and the world’s interest—is generally taken for granted domestically. Opposition to it is limited to the libertarian Right and anti-imperialist Left, both groups on the margins of mainstream political discourse. Today, American supremacy is assumed rather than argued for: in an age of tremendous political division, it is a bipartisan first principle of foreign policy, a presupposition. In this area at least, one wishes for a little less agreement. In Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age, Christopher McKnight Nichols provides an erudite account of a period before such a consensus existed, when ideas about America’s role on the world stage were fundamentally contested. As this year’s presidential election approaches, each side will portray the difference between the candidates’ positions on foreign policy as immense. Revisiting Promise and Peril shows us just how narrow the American worldview has become, and how our public discourse has become narrower still. Nichols focuses on the years between 1890 and 1940, during America’s initial ascent as a global power. He gives special attention to the formative debates surrounding the Spanish-American War, U.S. entry into the First World War, and potential U.S. membership in the League of Nations—debates that were constitutive of larger battles over the nature of American society and its fragile political institutions and freedoms. During this period, foreign and domestic policy were often linked as part of a cohesive political vision for the country. Nichols illustrates this through intellectual profiles of some of the period’s most influential figures, including senators Henry Cabot Lodge and William Borah, socialist leader Eugene Debs, philosopher and psychologist William James, journalist Randolph Bourne, and the peace activist Emily Balch. Each of them interpreted isolationism and internationalism in distinct ways, sometimes deploying the concepts more for rhetorical purposes than as cornerstones of a particular worldview. Today, isolationism is often portrayed as intellectually bankrupt, a redoubt for idealists, nationalists, xenophobes, and fools. Yet the term now used as a political epithet has deep roots in American political culture. Isolationist principles can be traced back to George Washington’s farewell address, during which he urged his countrymen to steer clear of “foreign entanglements” while actively seeking nonbinding commercial ties. (Whether economic commitments do in fact entail political commitments is another matter.) Thomas Jefferson echoed this sentiment when he urged for “commerce with all nations, [and] alliance with none.” Even the Monroe Doctrine, in which the United States declared itself the regional hegemon and demanded noninterference from European states in the Western hemisphere, was often viewed as a means of isolating the United States from Europe and its messy alliance system. In Nichols’s telling, however, modern isolationism was born from the debates surrounding the Spanish-American War and the U.S. annexation of the Philippines. Here isolationism began to take on a much more explicitly anti-imperialist bent. Progressive isolationists such as William James found U.S. policy in the Philippines—which it had “liberated” from Spanish rule just to fight a bloody counterinsurgency against Philippine nationalists—anathema to American democratic traditions and ideas about national self-determination. As Promise and Peril shows, however, “cosmopolitan isolationists” like James never called for “cultural, economic, or complete political separation from the rest of the world.” Rather, they wanted the United States to engage with other nations peacefully and without pretensions of domination. They saw the United States as a potential force for good in the world, but they also placed great value on neutrality and non-entanglement, and wanted America to focus on creating a more just domestic order. James’s anti-imperialism was directly related to his fear of the effects of “bigness.” He argued forcefully against all concentrations of power, especially those between business, political, and military interests. He knew that such vested interests would grow larger and more difficult to control if America became an overseas empire. Others, such as “isolationist imperialist” Henry Cabot Lodge, the powerful senator from Massachusetts, argued that fighting the Spanish-American War and annexing the Philippines were isolationist actions to their core. First, banishing the Spanish from the Caribbean comported with the Monroe Doctrine; second, adding colonies such as the Philippines would lead to greater economic growth without exposing the United States to the vicissitudes of outside trade. Prior to the Spanish-American War, many feared that the American economy’s rapid growth would lead to a surplus of domestic goods and cause an economic disaster. New markets needed to be opened, and the best way to do so was to dominate a given market—that is, a country—politically. Lodge’s defense of this “large policy” was public and, by today’s standards, quite bald. Other proponents of this policy included Teddy Roosevelt (who also believed that war was good for the national character) and a significant portion of the business class. For Lodge and Roosevelt, “isolationism” meant what is commonly referred to today as “unilateralism”: the ability for the United States to do what it wants, when it wants. Other “isolationists” espoused principles that we would today call internationalist. Randolph Bourne, a precocious journalist working for the New Republic, passionately opposed American entry into the First World War, much to the detriment of his writing career. He argued that hypernationalism would cause lasting damage to the American social fabric. He was especially repulsed by wartime campaigns to Americanize immigrants. Bourne instead envisioned a “transnational America”: a place that, because of its distinct cultural and political traditions and ethnic diversity, could become an example to the rest of the world. Its respect for plurality at home could influence other countries by example, but also by allowing it to mediate international disputes without becoming a party to them. Bourne wanted an America fully engaged with the world, but not embroiled in military conflicts or alliances. This was also the case for William Borah, the progressive Republican senator from Idaho. Borah was an agrarian populist and something of a Jeffersonian: he believed axiomatically in local democracy and rejected many forms of federal encroachment. He was opposed to extensive immigration, but not “anti-immigrant.” Borah thought that America was strengthened by its complex ethnic makeup and that an imbalance tilted toward one group or another would have deleterious effects. But it is his famously isolationist foreign policy views for which Borah is best known. As Nichols writes: He was consistent in an anti-imperialist stance against U.S. domination abroad; yet he was ambivalent in cases involving what he saw as involving obvious national interest….He also without fail argued that any open-ended military alliances were to be avoided at all costs, while arguing that to minimize war abroad as well as conflict at home should always be a top priority for American politicians. Borah thus cautiously supported entry into the First World War on national interest grounds, but also led a group of senators known as “the irreconcilables” in their successful effort to prevent U.S. entry into the League of Nations. His paramount concern was the collective security agreement in the organization’s charter: he would not assent to a treaty that stipulated that the United States would be obligated to intervene in wars between distant powers where the country had no serious interest at stake. Borah possessed an alternative vision for a more just and pacific international order. Less than a decade after he helped scuttle American accession to the League, he helped pass the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) in a nearly unanimous Senate vote. More than sixty states eventually became party to the pact, which outlawed war between its signatories and required them to settle their disputes through peaceful means. Today, realists sneer at the idealism of Kellogg-Briand, but the Senate was aware of the pact’s limitations and carved out clear exceptions for cases of national defense. Some supporters believed that, if nothing else, the law would help strengthen an emerging international norm against war. (Given what followed, this seems like a sad exercise in wish-fulfillment.) Unlike the League of Nations charter, the treaty faced almost no opposition from the isolationist bloc in the Senate, since it did not require the United States to enter into a collective security agreement or abrogate its sovereignty. This was a kind of internationalism Borah and his irreconcilables could proudly support. The United States today looks very different from the country in which Borah, let alone William James, lived, both domestically (where political and civil freedoms have been extended to women, African Americans, and gays and lesbians) and internationally (with its leading role in many global institutions). But different strains of isolationism persist. Newt Gingrich has argued for a policy of total “energy independence” (in other words, domestic drilling) while fulminating against President Obama for “bowing” to the Saudi king. While recently driving through an agricultural region of rural Colorado, I saw a giant roadside billboard calling for American withdrawal from the UN. Yet in the last decade, the Republican Party, with the partial exception of its Ron Paul/libertarian faction, has veered into such a belligerent unilateralism that its graybeards—one of whom, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, just lost a primary to a far-right challenger partly because of his reasonableness on foreign affairs—were barely able to ensure Senate ratification of a key nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. Many of these same people desire a unilateral war with Iran. And it isn’t just Republicans. Drone attacks have intensified in Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere under the Obama administration. Massive troop deployments continue unabated. We spend over $600 billion dollars a year on our military budget; the next largest is China’s, at “only” around $100 billion. Administrations come and go, but the national security state appears here to stay.

## Exceptionalism

**Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality**

Cummiskey 90– Professor of Philosophy, Bates David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical considerat

ion to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

#### Ethical policymaking requires calculation of consequences

Gvosdev 5 – Rhodes scholar, PhD from St. Antony’s College, executive editor of The National Interest; Nikolas, The Value(s) of Realism, SAIS Review 25.1, pmuse,

As the name implies, realists focus on promoting policies that are achievable and sustainable. In turn, the morality of a foreign policy action is judged by its results, not by the intentions of its framers. A foreign policymaker must weigh the consequences of any course of action and assess the resources at hand to carry out the proposed task. As Lippmann warned, Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.8 Commenting on this maxim, Owen Harries, founding editor of The National Interest, noted, "This is a truth of which Americans—more apt to focus on ends rather than means when it comes to dealing with the rest of the world—need always to be reminded."9 In fact, Morgenthau noted that "there can be no political morality without prudence."10 This virtue of prudence—which Morgenthau identified as the cornerstone of realism—should not be confused with expediency. Rather, it takes as its starting point that it is more moral to fulfill one's commitments than to make "empty" promises, and to seek solutions that minimize harm and produce sustainable results. Morgenthau concluded: [End Page 18] Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible, between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.11 This is why, prior to the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia, U.S. and European realists urged that Bosnia be decentralized and partitioned into ethnically based cantons as a way to head off a destructive civil war. Realists felt this would be the best course of action, especially after the country's first free and fair elections had brought nationalist candidates to power at the expense of those calling for inter-ethnic cooperation. They had concluded—correctly, as it turned out—that the United States and Western Europe would be unwilling to invest the blood and treasure that would be required to craft a unitary Bosnian state and give it the wherewithal to function. Indeed, at a diplomatic conference in Lisbon in March 1992, the various factions in Bosnia had, reluctantly, endorsed the broad outlines of such a settlement. For the purveyors of moralpolitik, this was unacceptable. After all, for this plan to work, populations on the "wrong side" of the line would have to be transferred and resettled. Such a plan struck directly at the heart of the concept of multi-ethnicity—that different ethnic and religious groups could find a common political identity and work in common institutions. When the United States signaled it would not accept such a settlement, the fragile consensus collapsed. The United States, of course, cannot be held responsible for the war; this lies squarely on the shoulders of Bosnia's political leaders. Yet Washington fell victim to what Jonathan Clarke called "faux Wilsonianism," the belief that "high-flown words matter more than rational calculation" in formulating effective policy, which led U.S. policymakers to dispense with the equation of "balancing commitments and resources."12 Indeed, as he notes, the Clinton administration had criticized peace plans calling for decentralized partition in Bosnia "with lofty rhetoric without proposing a practical alternative." The subsequent war led to the deaths of tens of thousands and left more than a million people homeless. After three years of war, the Dayton Accords—hailed as a triumph of American diplomacy—created a complicated arrangement by which the federal union of two ethnic units, the Muslim-Croat Federation, was itself federated to a Bosnian Serb republic. Today, Bosnia requires thousands of foreign troops to patrol its internal borders and billions of dollars in foreign aid to keep its government and economy functioning. Was the aim of U.S. policymakers, academics and journalists—creating a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia—not worth pursuing? No, not at all, and this is not what the argument suggests. But aspirations were not matched with capabilities. As a result of holding out for the "most moral" outcome and encouraging the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo to pursue maximalist aims rather than finding a workable compromise that could have avoided bloodshed and produced more stable conditions, the peoples of Bosnia suffered greatly. In the end, the final settlement was very close [End Page 19] to the one that realists had initially proposed—and the one that had also been roundly condemned on moral grounds.

#### Their security reps don’t spillover

**Mearsheimer 1**, Poli. Sci. Prof. @ U. Chicago, (John J., *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*)

Great powers cannot commit themselves to the pursuit of a peaceful world order for two reasons. First, states are unlikely to agree on a general formula for bolstering peace. Certainly, international relations scholars have never reached a consensus on what the blueprint should look like. In fact, it seems there are about as many theories on the causes of war and peace as there are scholars studying the subject. But more important, poli­cymakers are unable to agree on how to create a stable world. For exam­ple, at the Paris Peace Conference after World War I, important differences over how to create stability in Europe divided Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, and Woodrow Wilson.49 In particular, Clemenceau was determined to impose harsher terms on Germany over the Rhineland than was either Lloyd George or Wilson, while Lloyd George stood out as the hard-liner on German reparations. The Treaty of Versailles, not sur­prisingly, did little to promote European stability.

Furthermore, consider American thinking on how to achieve stability in Europe in the early days of the Cold War.50 The key elements for a sta­ble and durable system were in place by the early 1950s. They included the division of Germany, the positioning of American ground forces in Western Europe to deter a Soviet attack, and ensuring that West Germany would not seek to develop nuclear weapons. Officials in the Truman administration, however, disagreed about whether a divided Germany would be a source of peace or war. For example, George Kennan and Paul Nitze, who held important positions in the State Department, believed that a divided Germany would be a source of instability, whereas Secretary of State Dean Acheson disagreed with them. In the 1950s, President Eisenhower sought to end the American commitment to defend Western Europe and to provide West Germany with its own nuclear deterrent. This policy, which was never fully adopted, nevertheless caused significant instability in Europe, as it led directly to the Berlin crises of 1958-59 and 1961."

Second, great powers cannot put aside power considerations and work to promote international peace because they cannot be sure that their efforts will succeed. If their attempt fails, they are likely to pay a steep price for having neglected the balance of power, because if an aggressor appears at the door there will be no answer when they dial 911. That is a risk few states are willing to run. Therefore, prudence dictates that they behave according to realist logic. This line of reasoning accounts for why collective security schemes, which call for states to put aside narrow con­cerns about the balance of power and instead act in accordance with the broader interests of the international community, invariably die at birth.

#### The aff fails and destroys minority rights – sectarian violence causes re-securitization

**Roe**, Assistant Professor, International Relations and European Studies – Central European University, **‘4**

(Paul, “Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization,” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 35, No. 3, September)

Aradau’s (valuable) contentions aside, what I want to emphasize here is the particular understanding of securitization in terms of deconstructing identities – where the label ‘migrant’ is subordinated to other, individual identity markers. In this next section, however, what I want to show is how the deconstructivist strategy might be considered a ‘logical impossibility’ when set against the different context of protecting minority rights – that is, where, as an identity marker, the collective (the ethnic and/or the national) is necessarily considered primary. Minority Rights, Societal Security and (the Impossibility of) Desecuritization Taking a lead from Wæver, Kymlicka has also expressed a preference for desecuritization. Speaking of **minority rights**, Kymlicka notes that while in the West the claims of minorities are assessed in terms of justice, in much of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) they **are assessed in terms of security.** Moreover, the discourses of justice and security ‘pull in different directions’: security discourse effectively closes the space for minority rights to be framed in terms of justice (Kymlicka, 2001a: 1–2). Kymlicka’s claim with regard to the distinction between justice (in Western Europe) and security (in Eastern Europe) may, in itself, be contentious,4 but this is not necessarily my concern. Rather, what I would like to concentrate on is more the point that minority rights are often subject to the language of security and – this being the case – Kymlicka’s argument that the most effective strategy for enhancing minority rights in this situation is ‘to desecuritize the discourse . . . to get people to think of minority claims in terms of justice/fairness rather than loyalty/security’ (2001a: 2). I will come back to Kymlicka’s own suggested strategy for descuritization at the end of this section. But, first of all, I want to set a Huysmans-like deconstructivist approach in this very context. My starting point in thinking about this lies in Gaetano Pentassuglia’s (2003: 29) assertion that although the notion of minority rights has often been less than clearly defined, ‘the “right to identity”, going beyond the “minimalist”, physical discrimination and antidiscrimination entitlements, stands out as the overarching guarantee informing the whole notion of minority rights’. In other words, over and above all other principles, it is **the maintenance of group identity** that **underpins the provision of minority rights.** The same is also made clear in the interpretation of minority rights promoted by the OSCE’s High Commissioner for National Minorities: ‘First of all, a minority is a group with linguistic, ethnic or cultural characteristics which distinguish it from the majority. Secondly, a minority is a group which usually not only seeks to maintain its identity but also tries to give a stronger expression to that identity’ (Kemp, 2001: 30). Or, in the language of the Copenhagen School, being a minority, and thus pursuing minority rights, is a matter of ‘societal security’. In the 1993 book Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (Wæver et al., 1993), Barry Buzan’s (1991) previous five-dimensional approach to international security is reconceptualized. In addition to the five sectors of state security (military, political, economic, societal and environmental), a duality of state and societal security is also conceived: societal security is retained as a sector of state security, but it is also a referent object of security in its own right (Wæver, 1993: 25). In this new formulation, whereas, according to Wæver, state security is concerned with threats to the state’s sovereignty – if a state loses its sovereignty it will not survive as a state – societal security is all about threats to collective identity – if a society loses its identity it will not survive as a society (Wæver, 1993: 25–26). In simple terms, the Copenhagen School defines societies as politically significant ethnic, national or religious groups – collectivities that can act alongside, indeed even challenge, states in the international system. Thus, societal security concerns whatever threats bring the identity of such units into question. For Buzan, threats to societal identity can occur through the ‘sustained application of repressive measures against the expression of identity’, which can include ‘forbidding the use of language, names and dress, through closure of places of worship, to the deportation or killing of members of the community’ (Buzan, 1993: 43). In terms of defending societal identity, the Copenhagen School recognizes that ‘for threatened societies, one obvious response is to strengthen societal identity. This can be done by using cultural means to reinforce social cohesion and distinctiveness and to ensure that society reproduces itself effectively’ (Wæver et al., 1993: 191). Wæver captures the dynamic neatly, commenting that culture can be defended ‘with culture’, adding that ‘if one’s identity seems threatened . . . the answer is a strengthening of existing identities. In this sense, consequently, culture becomes security policy’ (Wæver, 1995: 68; my emphasis). Therefore, the likely response to such threats is either to safeguard the maintenance of, or to seek the restoration of, the means and practices that ensure the expression and continuity of group identity. When societal security concerns are considered within the subsequent securitization concept, the defence (maintenance/restoration) of societal identity is conceived as a discourse that is potentially available to a securitizing actor. Societal security speech acts will thus display the language of **existential threat** presented in identity terms on behalf of a collectivity (society). Securitizing actors may speak of ‘security’ itself, or instead describe threats to the identity of the group through synonyms – for example, ‘die’, ‘perish’, ‘wither’, ‘weaken’, ‘waste’, ‘decline’, and so forth. Williams notes how ‘within the specific terms of security as a speech act . . . it is precisely under the condition of attempted securitizations that a reified, monolithic form of identity is declared’ and, if this is successful, ‘[the identity’s] negotiability and flexibility are challenged, denied, or suppressed’ (Williams, 2003: 519). He continues: ‘A successful securitization of identity involves precisely the capacity to decide on the limits of a given identity, to oppose it to what it is not, to cast this as a relationship of threat or even enmity, and to have this decision or declaration accepted by the relevant group’ (Williams, 2003: 520). Securitizing within the societal sector is therefore concerned with the defining of us and them, maintaining our identity as opposed to theirs. Thus, **the language of societal security is the language of minority rights.** As such, to desecuritize in the societal sector entails that the language of maintaining collective identity be effectively **taken out of the discourse.** In Huysmans’s deconstructivist strategy, the language of the collectivity, ‘migrants’, is replaced with the language of the individual, ‘migrant’. Thus, the potential fluidity of the individual migrant’s identity provides a possible escape route from the constraints of the us–them dichotomy. In the context of minority rights, however, the necessity on the part of the minority (and indeed also the majority) for group distinctiveness necessarily **blocks this** same **way out:** the language of the individual is subordinated to the language of the collective. In other words, how is it possible to desecuritize through identity deconstruction when both minorities and majorities often strive for the reification of distinct collectivities? **To remove the language of security from the issue of minority rights**, to shift from a position of societal security to one of societal asecurity, is in essence to stop talking about group distinctiveness. In this way, it **signals the death of the** collectivity, of the **distinct minority.** This point is similar to that made by so-called post-structural security studies (e.g., Campbell, 1992; Klein, 1994; Shapiro, 1997), where, in terms of the state, security is not so much a function of the unit as an assertion of itself: it is ‘discourses of danger’ (Campbell, 1992) on the part of the state that are constitutive of the latter’s own identity. Commenting on David Campbell’s work, Steve Smith notes how, in this way, this identity is never fixed, and never final; it is always in the process of becoming and ‘should the state project of security be successful in terms in which it is articulated, the state would cease to exist.. . . Ironically, then, the inability of the state project of security to succeed is the guarantor of the state’s continued success’ (Smith, 2000: 95). Equally, minority rights is ‘the process of becoming’; it is an ongoing project that enables the minority to reproduce its group distinctiveness. Should its project of societal security be successful, in the sense that collective identity is no longer something that needs to be maintained, then, again, the minority will cease to exist. To restate: the **desecuritization of minority rights may** thus **be logically impossible.** This, I acknowledge, is a very strong claim to make. And although it is a claim that I wish to stick to, I do so in the knowledge of a number of important contentions. A first is that I have chosen a particular understanding of minority rights, one that ignores a more complex rendering of the situation in which political and economic insecurities are also of importance. This I accept, together with its corollary that there may be no logical impossibility at all of desecuritizing in other such situations. My approach is clearly very much contextual, and although thus relatively limited in empirical terms (to Central and Eastern Europe perhaps?), it nonetheless serves a more than useful purpose in terms of thinking conceptually about the desecuritization process. A second is that I have utilized a particular understanding of desecuritization – a Huysmans-type strategy predicated on the deconstruction of identity. Again, this is true, which is why I now want to return to Kymlicka and to what may be described as a more objectivist desecuritizing approach. Although Kymlicka is relatively unsure as to how to proceed in terms of desecuritization, he does suggest that a first step must be to grapple with the issue of territorial (political) autonomy and (possible) secession. He notes how political autonomy for minority groups might be decoupled from secession: ‘to persuade [CEE] states to put [political autonomy] on the agenda, while agreeing . . . that secession cannot be a legitimate topic of public debate or political mobilization’ (Kymlicka, 2001b: 46). But, as Kymlicka also points out, even with certain guarantees in place, CEE states have nonetheless been more than reluctant to consider claims for political autonomy, this stemming from the fear that political autonomy will naturally lead to stronger calls for secession. Kymlicka’s suggestion, though, is ‘just the opposite. I believe that democratic federalism reduces the likelihood of secession’ (Kymlicka, 2001b: 49). And here it is worthwhile quoting Kymlicka at length: We need to challenge the assumption that eliminating secession from the political agenda should be the first goal of the state. We should try to show that secession is not necessarily a crime against humanity, and that the goal of the democratic political system shouldn’t be to make it unthinkable. States and state borders are not sacred. The first goal of a state should be to promote democracy, human rights, justice and the wellbeing of citizens, not to somehow insist that every citizen views herself as bound to the existing state in ‘perpetuity’ – a goal that can only be achieved through undemocratic and unjust means in a multinational state. A state can only enjoy the benefits of democracy and federalism if it is willing to live with the risks of secession (Kymlicka, 2001b: 50). To desecuritize minority rights, then, is to accept the previously unacceptable: to open up, through democratic federalism, the **possibility of** political autonomy and **secession**; to make minority rights part of normal politics. Kymlicka’s approach here in some way seems to resemble an objectivist strategy of desecuritization. In the West, the acceptance of secession, he notes, is ‘tied to the fact that secession would not threaten the survival of the minority nation. Secession may involve the painful loss of territory, but it is not seen as a threat to the very survival of the majority nation or state’ (Kymlicka, 2001b: 50). In the East (or Central and Eastern Europe), however, the tendency is to believe that secession ‘forebodes national death’ (Bibo, in Kymlicka, 2001b: 50). The question, therefore, is how to make the case that the minority does not really represent a threat. From a Huysmans-type point of view, **this** kind of **strategy** clearly **reproduces the us–them dichotomy**: ‘we’ should accept, as part of being normal, that ‘they’ might not want to live with ‘us’ anymore! And this runs the risk that the minority, as with the migrant, will remain as the ‘unified cultural alien’ (Huysmans, 1995: 66). However, in order for group distinctiveness to be successfully reproduced, such a dichotomy must arguably be maintained. But, this being the case, the further risk perhaps is that the very possibility of political autonomy and secession will not only serve to reproduce the dichotomy between us and them, but will also potentially **transform this dichotomy into** one of **friend–enemy**. In other words, **it threatens to (re)securitize the situation**, not ‘normalize’ it. Conclusion: Towards the ‘Managing’ of Minority Rights? The assumption that more security is not always better has found a great deal of its expression in the context of migration. To frame the issue of migration in security terms is, as Huysmans describes, to see it as a ‘drama’, one ‘in which selves and others are constituted in a dialectic of inclusion and exclusion and in which this dialectic appears as a struggle for survival’ (Huysmans, 1995: 63). As a security drama, there is always the risk of violence between the natives and the aliens, and ‘there are good arguments for saying that in the present western European context that risk is relatively high’ (Huysmans, 1995: 63). The concept of desecuritization, where migration is moved from emergency politics to normal politics, where the migrant is taken out of the security drama, has thus far centred very much on the deconstruction of collective identities, where the label ‘migrant’ is subordinated to a plurality of other, more ‘everyday’ identity markers. In Central and Eastern Europe, the security drama has often been played out more in terms of minorities than in terms of migrants. But taking the minority out of the drama cannot always follow the same escape route as the migrant. Where minority rights are predicated on the maintenance of a distinct collectivity, other, everyday identity markers will remain subordinate to the ethnic/national. In these cases, therefore, a Huysmans-type deconstructivist strategy may well, as I have argued, be a logical impossibility. My conclusion in this respect thus points to the consideration of alternative ways of dealing with securitized issues: if minority rights cannot always be ‘transformed’, then perhaps they can be sometimes ‘managed’ instead. Thinking in these terms certainly reflects Wæver’s concerns with the strong self-reinforcing character of securitization in the societal sector, but does not necessarily lead to a Wæver-type conclusion that strategies should thereby be designed to ‘forestall’ emergency politics. **Management** in this sense **is about ‘moderate’** (**not excessive**) **securitization**, about ‘sensible’ (not irrational) securitization. Where societal security dilemmas occur, management is about ‘mitigating’ or ‘ameliorating’ them, not transcending them. As I alluded earlier in the article, managing the securitization of minority rights will not return the issue to normal politics in the Copenhagen School sense of it – that is to say, the situation will still be marked by the language of (societal) security. What **management can** do, however, is to ‘**normalize’ minority rights** in terms of seeking to regulate minority–majority relations **through** more **liberal democratic forms.** For such a strategy, there is the clear acceptance that both sides have genuine security concerns. As such, the strategy is to move the situation from a condition of insecurity (insufficient defence) to one of security (sufficient defence), and not from a condition of security to asecurity. The minority can feel secure when certain provisions/ legislations/mechanisms are put in place that will guarantee its existence (in identity terms), while similarly the majority can also feel secure in the knowledge that the minority will thus work (politically, economically and also societally) within the existing framework of the state. Thus, and returning to Kymlicka, the institutionalizing of a federal state structure is desirable not because it makes the possibility of political autonomy and secession something normal, but because it provides the mechanisms through which **the justification for emergency politics on both sides is reduced.**

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## OV

#### Nuclear weapon reps key to action

Lynda **Hurst**, writer for the Toronto Star, May 30, **2009**, “Why we should start worrying and learn to fear the bomb again” <http://www.thestar.com/comment/columnists/article/642826>

It has been a while since the world heard the kind of thumping rhetorical menace that burst out of **North Korea** this week. **After conducting its second nuclear test**, the isolated totalitarian state **warned** **that "even a minor accidental clash could lead to nuclear war.** It's a matter of time when a fuse for war is triggered." **That kind of** confrontational **language** – best **exemplified by** Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's "**We will bury you**" outburst in 1956 – **terrified people back in the Cold War**. **But the world has since got used to provocative threats**. **The visceral fear of atomic Armageddon that gripped people in the 1950s and '60s no longer exists. The last big public protests against nuclear arms ended in the 1980s.** Today, many regard the spread of the technology as inevitable, if not already a fait accompli. Perhaps **desensitization is a natural phenomenon, especially when other pressures, the looming environmental crisis** chief among them, **grab centre-stage. Or maybe people simply accept the threat as permanent white noise in the background that can be tuned out – until the volume is** temporarily **turned up by someone** like North Korea's erratic president, Kim Jong-il, or Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. "**There's a generation and a half of citizens who just say `whatever' even when a bad regime gets into the nuclear arena,"** says George Lopez, a Notre Dame University peace studies specialist. He sees it in his classes all the time. "**They've never experienced the actual threat of nuclear war, never had to hide under their desks like schoolchildren did during the Cold War."**  **Younger people may worry about a terrorist dirty bomb, but not an exchange between states**. "It's like people in San Francisco who know they're living on top of a faultline but don't think an earthquake will happen in their lifetime." **People respond to the risk of environmental collapse because they feel they personally can do something to prevent** or mitigate **it**, says Lopez. "**But with nuclear politics, real citizens don't get a chance to play. It belongs to the elites**." **That**, he predicts, **is about to change**. Canadian **Nobel laureate** John **Polanyi**, a long-time disarmament advocate, agrees. "I think the looming environmental crisis will pull attention back to the nuclear issue because the two are linked, they're both about mass destruction. Reason will impel the public." Remember the Doomsday clock? Begun in 1947 by a group of atomic scientists to track the U.S.-Soviet arms race, it advances or retreats toward midnight – midnight symbolizing humanity's nuclear self-destruction. In 1991, after the fall of communism, the hands of the clock were put back as far as they'd ever been: 17 minutes to midnight. In the warm glow of the Cold War's end, the U.S. stopped making nuclear arms. In 1996, it was the first nation to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. But the optimism was short-lived. Committed to the test ban in principle – certainly in regard to other nations – the U.S. wanted to keep its options open and in 1999, to universal dismay, refused to ratify the treaty. Though signed by 180 other countries, it has never come into effect. Result? A second, even more dangerous, era of proliferation. The U.N. says **more than 40 nations now have the nuclear wherewithal to make weapons**, some undoubtedly customers of rogue scientists such as Pakistan's infamous Abdul Qadeer Khan. His 20-year trafficking network wasn't halted until 2004, long after he'd sold centrifuge parts to North Korea, Iran and, before it recanted its nuclear aspirations, Libya. The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that 827 nuclear smuggling incidents occurred between 1993 and 2005, several involving plutonium or highly enriched uranium. U.S. President Barack **Obama's call last month for a nuclear-free planet may have been lashed by critics as naive, but no one could accuse him of not understanding what the world is up against**. "Black markets trade in nuclear secrets and materials," he said. "The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one... As more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point when the centre cannot hold." And **the Doomsday clock**? It **has ticked forward to five minutes to midnight**. No one knows precisely how many nuclear weapons there are in the world. They're state secrets. But the best-expert estimates are about 24,000 bombs of varying strengths, 8,100 of them operational. North Korea, the ninth nation to conduct tests, is believed to have enough plutonium on hand to built eight warheads. That fact could trigger a broader East Asian arms race, as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are forced to assess whether to go nuclear for self-protection. Japan, the first victim of nuclear weapons, has said it could build one within six months. Chain effects have occurred before. After India's first nuclear test in 1974, Pakistan successfully hustled to keep par. And Israel's (unadmitted) stockpile of 200 warheads is seen as the prime driver of Iran's move into the nuclear arena. As a result of Iran's decision, Egypt and Saudi Arabia suddenly did an about-face on previous policy, announcing plans to develop "peaceful" programs. But once in place, the infrastructure can easily be retooled for military use. The public doesn't realize it, says Kennette Benedict, publisher of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, whose board operates the Doomsday clock, but the U.S. and Russia still have more than 2,200 warhead on constant high alert. "That means they're ready to launch within 10 minutes," she says from Chicago. "People aren't aware of the ongoing state of readiness or the size of the U.S. stockpile or the fact that the command and control system has been hacked into twice." Though both nations have dismantled some weapons, the U.S. clings to a large nuclear arsenal of about 9,500. Russia also remains heavily fortified with about 13,000 operational warheads. An ongoing concern is that half its arsenal, which is spread throughout former Soviet states, is poorly stored and vulnerable to theft by terrorists or sale by corrupt guards. The road to a nuclear-free world is also complicated by the massive global stockpile of fissile material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) that could fuel thousands of explosives. The greater the number of states that have this material the greater the chances of it falling into the hands of terrorists. While Obama has unveiled plans to choke off fissile production and secure loose nuclear material around the world within four years, some argue it's already too late; the illicit spread cannot be checked. Critics say getting control of the known nuclear situation and halting proliferation are formidable enough goals. They would require all nuclear weapons to be acknowledged and accounted for, to be verifiably and irreversibly dismantled, and an effective system to stop cheaters put in place. Is that remotely achievable? Yes, with persistence and patience, Obama has said, though it won't be reached anytime soon, "perhaps not in my lifetime." Kennette Benedict says bluntly **the public must once again**, as in decades past, **start pressuring leaders: "It will take citizen involvement to get** political action." Earlier this month, 17 Noble laureates issued a declaration warning that either the course toward abolition is set or the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki will be repeated. Eliminating nuclear weapons is possible, they wrote, and "we call on the citizens of the world to press their **leaders to grasp the peril of inaction**."

## AT: Kerry talks

#### Barriers overwhelm

Haven ’13 – Paul. Staffer for the AP. “Cuba, US try Talking, but Face Many Obstacles” The Miami Times Herald, 6/21/13

To be sure, there is still far more that separates the long-time antagonists than unites them. The State Department has kept Cuba on a list of state sponsors of terrorism and another that calls into question Havana’s commitment to fighting human trafficking. The Obama administration continues to demand democratic change on an island ruled for more than a half century by Castro and his brother Fidel. For its part, Cuba continues to denounce Washington’s 51-year-old economic embargo. And then there is Gross, the 64-year-old Maryland native who was arrested in 2009 and is serving a 15-year jail sentence for bringing communications equipment to the island illegally. His case has scuttled efforts at engagement in the past, and could do so again, U.S. officials say privately. Cuba has indicated it wants to trade Gross for four Cuban agents serving long jail terms in the United States, something Washington has said it won’t consider. Ted Henken, a professor of Latin American studies at Baruch College in New York who helped organize a recent U.S. tour by Cuban dissident blogger Yoani Sanchez, said the Obama administration is too concerned with upsetting Cuban-American politicians and has missed opportunities to engage with Cuba at a crucial time in its history. “I think that a lot more would have to happen for this to amount to momentum leading to any kind of major diplomatic breakthrough,” he said. “Obama should be bolder and more audacious.” Even these limited moves have sparked fierce criticism by those long opposed to engagement. Cuban-American congressman Mario Diaz Balart, a Florida Republican, called the recent overtures “disturbing.”

## Link

#### Plan seen as global weakness

Perales ’10 - José Raúl, Senior Program Associate at the Wilson Center, “The United States and Cuba:

Implications of an Economic Relationship”, August, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Cuba_Implications.pdf>

The U.S. embargo may need to be changed; however Sánchez vehemently opposed its complete elimination. The Helms-Burton Act created a clear roadmap stipulating the conditions by which the embargo could be suspended and ended. These include: legalization of political activity, the release of all political prisoners, dissolution of the Cuban Ministry of the Interior’s Department of State Security, establishment of an independent judiciary, and a government that does not include the Castro brothers. Only when these conditions are met and democracy is reestablished should the embargo be scrapped. Elimination of the embargo prior to meeting these conditions will rightly be perceived as weakness in the face of political pressure. For instance, the Obama administration has little intention of signing a free trade agreement with Colombia—a staunch ally with whom the United States has a very positive economic relationship—because of concern over the country’s inadequate labor rights. Imagine the hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy were it to punish a consolidated democracy with strong, albeit imperfect, labor rights, yet capitulate and reward the Cuban government for systematically abusing labor rights. What sort of message would that send to the world?

#### Years of work have gone into pressuring reform in Cuba. Backing out damages U.S. reputation irreparably

Castañeda ‘8 – Jorge Castañeda, professor at New York University and fellow at the New America Foundation, September-October 2008, “Morning in Latin America,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 5

Over the past few decades, the United States, Canada, the European Union, and Latin America have patiently constructed a regional legal framework to defend and encourage democratic rule as well as respect for human rights in the hemisphere. These values have been enshrined in conventions, charters, and free trade-agreements, from the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to the American Convention on Human Rights and the labor and environmental chapters of flee-trade agreements, as well as in the democratic clauses of the economic agreements between Chile and the EU and between Mexico and the EU. These mechanisms are not perfect, and they have not truly been tested. But to waive them in the interests of simply guaranteeing stability in Cuba and ensuring an exodus-free succession instead of a democratic transition--that is, creating once again a "Cuban exception" for reasons of pure pragmatism--would be unworthy of the enormous efforts every country in the hemisphere has made to deepen and strengthen democracy in the Americas. Cuba must return to the regional concert of powers, but accepting this concert's rules. To allow it to proceed otherwise would weaken democracy and encourage authoritarian traditions in the hemisphere--and lay the groundwork for other exceptions that would justify their existence by invoking the Cuban precedent.

## Case turn

#### Ethanol production causes warming – turns the aff – studies prove

Mendonça, 2009 (Maria Luisa Mendonça, researcher of the University of Sao Paulo , “Impacts of Expansion of Sugarcane Monocropping for Ethanol Production”, Land Research Action Network, 01/27/2009, <http://www.landaction.org/spip.php?article380>)

Brazil is the fourth country of the world which most emits carbon gas into the atmosphere. This occurs principally because of the destruction of the Amazon Rainforest, a destruction which accounts for 80% of the carbon gas emissions in the country.3 The expansion of monocropping for the production of agro-fuels tends to exacerbate this problem, advancing the agricultural borders of the Amazon and the Cerrado. Diverse studies show that the expansion of monocropping represents a greater risk for global warming that do emissions of carbon coming from fossil fuels. In spite of the Brazilian government’s attempts to convince the international community that Brazilian ethanol is “renewable,” between 2007 and 2008 there was a significant change with regard to this idea. The problem of many studies done before was that they excluded the environmental impacts of the model of production, from the use of natural resources (like land and water) to the pressure to use preservation areas, or areas used for food production. One report from Time Magazine observes that these studies have calculated the potential to tie up carbon from agro-fuels without taking into account the impact of monocropping in areas where vegetation and soil accumulate a great quantity of carbon. “It is as if these scientists image that biofuels are cultivated in parking lots,” said the article.4 One of the most important studies about the change in the forms of land use and its relation to the increase in carbon emissions was published in Science magazine. The authors affirm that “The majority of the previous studies discovered that replacing gasoline with biofuels could reduce carbon emission. Those analyses do not take into account that carbon emission happens when farmers, throughout the world, respond to higher prices and convert forests and fields into new plantations, to substitute plantations of grain which were used for biofuels.”5 The article cites the increase in soy prices as an influencing factor in the acceleration of deforestation in the Amazon, and estimates that its cultivation for the production of diesel results in a carbon debt from which will take 319 years to recover. According to researcher Timothy Searchinger, from Princeton University, “Forests and fields have much carbon, however, there is no way to reap the benefits by transforming these lands into crops for biofuels.” This study demonstrates that the effects of production of agro-fuels should be evaluated with the whole cycle of monoculture expansion. In Brazil, we know that sugarcane plantations are expanding very quickly, “pushing” forward agricultural borders and, at the same time, preparing the way for the expansion of cattle-raising and soy production. Given this, a true environmental impact study should include the whole agricultural sector and the whole process of ethanol production. In January of 2008, the Smithsonian Institute of Tropical Research reported that sugar-based ethanol and soy-based agro-diesel cause more damage to the environment than fossil fuels. The research draws attention to the environmental destruction in Brazil, caused by the increase in the production of sugarcane and soy in the Amazon, the Atlantic Rainforest, and the Cerrado. According to researcher William Laurance, “the production of fuels, be it from soy or sugar, also causes an increase in the cost of food, both in a direct and indirect way.”6 The release of these studies confirms the denouncements from social organizations and shows the change in tone of the international debate on these issues. As the newspaper El País observes, “diverse research centers, and the majority of ecological and human rights groups send out daily declarations affirming that biofuels do not help to combat climatic changes, but provoke serious environmental impacts on regions with high ecological value, alter the price of food, and consolidate an agricultural model based on exploitation of workers and high dependence on big multinational companies.”7

## Neolib good

#### American hegemonic decline causes preemptive lash-out, collapses global trade and makes global problems such as warming, water scarcity and disease inevitable.

Beckley ‘12

Michael, Assistant professor of political science at Tufts, research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School's. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited,” PhD dissertation, AM

One danger is that declinism could prompt trade conflicts and immigration restrictions. The results of this study suggest that the United States benefits immensely from the free flow of goods, services, and people around the globe; this is what allows American corporations to specialize in high-­‐value activities, exploit innovations created elsewhere, and lure the brightest minds to the United States, all while reducing the price of goods for U.S. consumers. Characterizing China’s export expansion as a loss for the United States is not just bad economics; it blazes a trail for jingoistic and protectionist policies. It would be tragically ironic if Americans reacted to false prophecies of decline by cutting themselves off from a potentially vital source of American power. Another danger is that declinism may impair foreign policy decision-­‐making. If top government officials come to believe that China is overtaking the United States, they are likely to react in one of two ways, both of which are potentially disastrous. The first is that policymakers may imagine the United States faces a closing “window of opportunity” and should take action “while it still enjoys preponderance and not wait until the diffusion of power has already made international politics more competitive and unpredictable.”315 This belief may spur positive action, but it also invites parochial thinking, reckless behavior, and preventive war.316 As Robert Gilpin and others have shown, “hegemonic struggles have most frequently been triggered by fears of ultimate decline and the perceived erosion of power.”317 By fanning such fears, declinists may inadvertently promote the type of violent overreaction that they seek to prevent. The other potential reaction is retrenchment – the divestment of all foreign policy obligations save those linked to vital interests, defined in a narrow and national manner. Advocates of retrenchment assume, or hope, that the world will sort itself out on its own; that whatever replaces American hegemony, whether it be a return to balance-­‐of-­‐power politics or a transition to a post-­‐power paradise, will naturally maintain international order and prosperity. But order and prosperity are unnatural. They can never be presumed. When achieved, they are the result of determined action by powerful actors and, in particular, by the most powerful actor, which is, and will be for some time, the United States. Arms buildups, insecure sea-­‐lanes, and closed markets are only the most obvious risks of U.S. retrenchment. Less obvious are transnational problems, such as global warming, water scarcity, and disease, which may fester without a leader to rally collective action.

## AT: Layne

#### Layne has bad history

Snyder ‘6

Jack Snyder, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations at Columbia University's Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006, “The Crusade of Illusions”, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61758/jack-snyder/the-crusade-of-illusions

His account, however, is far too one-sided to convince, and Layne is wrong on many key issues. In his historical overview, he ignores the fact that the U.S. decision to withdraw from active participation in balancing power in Eurasia in the 1930s was a disaster, and that the U.S. victory in the Cold War came cheap compared to other historic contests for hegemony. Moreover, Stalin would never have accepted a deal to set up a truly independent Germany, because he rightly feared a rerun of World War II. And NATO was created because the Europeans pushed for it; if anyone was ambivalent about it, it was the U.S. Congress, which was reluctant to fund ongoing troop deployments abroad. More generally, Layne is right to worry that U.S. dominance may provoke resistance. But he overlooks the critical fact that during the Cold War, most states balanced against the weaker but more threatening Soviet Union, rather than against the stronger but more attractive United States. The result of such skewed historical judgments is that Layne unfairly dismisses the possibility that a consensual international order based on prudent, liberal American leadership could emerge.

## Util

#### Comes first – only impact you can’t recover from

Zygmunt Bauman**,** University of Leeds Professor Emeritus of Sociology, 1995, Life In Fragments: Essays In Postmodern Morality, p. 66-71

The being‑for is like living towards‑the‑future: a being filled with anticipation, a being aware of the abyss between future foretold and future that will eventually be; it is this gap which, like a magnet, draws the self towards the Other,as it draws life towards the future, making life into an activity of overcoming, transcending, leaving behind. The self stretches towards the Other, as life stretches towards the future; neither can grasp what it stretches toward, but it is in this hopeful and desperate, never conclusive and never abandoned stretching‑toward that the self is ever anew created and life ever anew lived. In the words of M. M. Bakhtin, it is only in this not‑yet accomplished world of anticipation and trial, leaning toward stubbornly an‑other Other, that life can be lived ‑ not in the world of the `events that occurred'; in the latter world, `it is impossible to live, to act responsibly; in it, I am not needed, in principle I am not there at all." Art, the Other, the future: what unites them, what makes them into three words vainly trying to grasp the same mystery, is the modality of possibility. A curious modality, at home neither in ontology nor epistemology; itself, like that which it tries to catch in its net, `always outside', forever `otherwise than being'. The possibility we are talking about here is not the all‑too‑familiar unsure‑of‑itself, and through that uncertainty flawed, inferior and incomplete being, disdainfully dismissed by triumphant existence as `mere possibility', `just a possibility'; possibility is instead `plus que la reahte' ‑ both the origin and the foundation of being. The hope, says Blanchot, proclaims the possibility of that which evades the possible; `in its limit, this is the hope of the bond recaptured where it is now lost."' The hope is always the hope of *being fu filled,* but what keeps the hope alive and so keeps the being open and on the move is precisely its *unfu filment.* One may say that the paradox *of hope* (and the paradox of possibility founded in hope) is that it may pursue its destination solely through betraying its nature; the most exuberant of energies expends itself in the urge towards rest. Possibility uses up its openness in search of closure. Its image of the better being is its own impoverishment . . . The togetherness of the being‑for is cut out of the same block; it shares in the paradoxical lot of all possibility. It lasts as long as it is unfulfilled, yet it uses itself up in never ending effort of fulfilment, of recapturing the bond, making it tight and immune to all future temptations. In an important, perhaps decisive sense, it is selfdestructive and self‑defeating: its triumph is its death. The Other, like restless and unpredictable art, like the future itself, is a *mystery.* And being‑for‑the‑Other, going towards the Other through the twisted and rocky gorge of affection, brings that mystery into view ‑ makes it into a challenge. That mystery is what has triggered the sentiment in the first place ‑ but cracking that mystery is what the resulting movement is about. The mystery must be unpacked so that the being‑for may focus on the Other: one needs to know what to focus on. (The `demand' is *unspoken,* the responsibility undertaken is *unconditional;* it is up to him or her who follows the demand and takes up the responsibility to decide what the following of that demand and carrying out of that responsibility means in practical terms.) Mystery ‑ noted Max Frisch ‑ (and the Other is a mystery), is an exciting puzzle, but one tends to get tired of that excitement. `And so one creates for oneself an image. This is a loveless act, the betrayal." Creating an image of the Other leads to the substitution of the image for the Other; the Other is now fixed ‑ soothingly and comfortingly. There is nothing to be excited about anymore. I know what the Other needs, I know where my responsibility starts and ends. Whatever the Other may now do will be taken down and used against him. What used to be received as an exciting surprise now looks more like perversion; what used to be adored as exhilarating creativity now feels like wicked levity. Thanatos has taken over from Eros, and the excitement of the ungraspable turned into the dullness and tedium of the grasped. But, as Gyorgy Lukacs observed, `everything one person may know about another is only expectation, only potentiality, only wish or fear, acquiring reality only as a result of what happens later, and this reality, too, dissolves straightaway into potentialities'. Only death, with its finality and irreversibility, puts an end to the musical‑chairs game of the real and the potential ‑ it once and for all closes the embrace of togetherness which was before invitingly open and tempted the lonely self." `Creating an image' is the dress rehearsal of that death. But creating an image is the inner urge, the constant temptation, the *must* of all affection . . . It is the loneliness of being abandoned to an unresolvable ambivalence and an unanchored and formless sentiment which sets in motion the togetherness of being‑for. But what loneliness seeks in togetherness is an end to its present condition ‑ an end to itself. Without knowing ‑ without being capable of knowing ‑ that the hope to replace the vexing loneliness with togetherness is founded solely on its own unfulfilment, and that once loneliness is no more, the togetherness ( the being‑for togetherness) must also collapse, as it cannot survive its own completion. What the loneliness seeks in togetherness (suicidally for its own cravings) is the foreclosing and pre‑empting of the future, cancelling the future before it comes, robbing it of mystery but also of the possibility with which it is pregnant. Unknowingly yet necessarily, it seeks it all to its own detriment, since the success (if there is a success) may only bring it back to where it started and to the condition which prompted it to start on the journey in the first place. The togetherness of being‑for is always in the future, and nowhere else. It is no more once the self proclaims: `I have arrived', `I have done it', `I fulfilled my duty.' The being‑for starts from the realization of the bottomlessness of the task, and ends with the declaration that the infinity has been exhausted. This is the tragedy of being‑for ‑ the reason why it cannot but be death‑bound while simultaneously remaining an undying attraction. In this tragedy, there are many happy moments, but no happy end. Death is always the foreclosure of possibilities, and it comes eventually in its own time, even if not brought forward by the impatience of love. The catch is to direct the affection to staving off the end, and to do this against the affection's nature. What follows is that, if moral relationship is grounded in the being-for togetherness (as it is), then it can exist as a project, and guide the self's conduct only as long as its nature of a project (a not yet-completed project) is not denied. Morality, like the future itself, is forever not‑yet. (And this is why the ethical code, any ethical code, the more so the more perfect it is by its own standards, supports morality the way the rope supports the hanged man.) It is because of our loneliness that we crave togetherness. It is because of our loneliness that we open up to the Other and allow the Other to open up to us. It is because of our loneliness (which is only belied, not overcome, by the hubbub of the being‑with) that we turn into moral selves. And it is only through allowing the togetherness its possibilities which only the future can disclose that we stand a chance of acting morally, and sometimes even of being good, in the present.

#### Specifically true for nuclear war – also it’s the ultimate immorality

NYE 86 Professor of IR – JFK School of Government – Harvard 1986 Nuclear Ethics

While the cosmopolitan approach has the virtue of accepting transnational realities and avoids the sanctification of the nation-state, an unsophisticated cosmopolitanism has serious drawbacks. First, if morality is about choices, then to underestimate the significance of states and boundaries is to fail to take into account the main features of the real setting in which the choices must be made. To pursue individual justice at the cost of survival or to launch human rights crusades that cannot hope to be fulfilled, yet interfere with prudential concerns about order, may lead to immoral consequences. And if such actions, for example the promotion of human rights in Eastern Europe, were to lead to crises and an unintended nuclear war the consequences might be the ultimate immorality. Applying ethics to foreign policy is more than merely constructing philosophical arguments; it must be relevant to the international domain in which moral choice is to be exercised.

# 1NR

## OV

#### Trade solves all of their impacts

Griswold 5 – director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (Daniel, “Peace on earth? Try free trade among men,” 12-29-2005, http://www.freetrade.org/node/282)

Buried beneath the daily stories about car bombs and insurgents is an underappreciated but comforting fact during this Christmas season: The world has somehow become a more peaceful place.

As one little-noticed headline on an Associated Press story recently reported, "**War declining worldwide, studies say."** According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts around the world has been in decline for the past half century. In just the past 15 years, ongoing conflicts have dropped from 33 to 18, with all of them now **civil conflicts within countries.** As 2005 draws to an end, no two nations in the world are at war with each other. The death toll from war has also been falling. According to the AP story, "The number killed in battle has fallen to its lowest point in the post-World War II period, dipping below 20,000 a year by one measure. Peacemaking missions, meanwhile, are growing in number." Those estimates are down sharply from annual tolls ranging from 40,000 to 100,000 in the 1990s, and from a peak of 700,000 in 1951 during the Korean War. Many causes lie behind the good news -- the end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy, among them -- but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role. Far from stoking a "World on Fire," as one misguided American author has argued, growing commercial ties between nations have had a dampening effect on armed conflict and war, for three main reasons. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend toward democracy, and democracies don't pick fights with each other. Freedom to trade nurtures democracy by expanding the middle class in globalizing countries and equipping people with tools of communication such as cell phones, satellite TV, and the Internet. With trade comes more travel, more contact with people in other countries, and more exposure to new ideas. Thanks in part to globalization, almost two thirds of the world's countries today are democracies -- a record high. Second, as national economies become more integrated with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war. Third, globalization allows nations to acquire wealth through production and trade rather than conquest of territory and resources. Increasingly, wealth is measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Those are assets that cannot be seized by armies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by trading away what they can produce best at home. Of course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace. Hot-blooded nationalism and ideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. But deep trade and investment ties among nations make war less attractive. Trade wars in the 1930s deepened the economic depression, exacerbated **global tensions**, and helped to **usher in a world war.** Out of the ashes of that experience, the United States urged Germany, France and other Western European nations to form a common market that has become the European Union. In large part because of their intertwined economies, a general war in Europe is now unthinkable. In East Asia, the extensive and growing economic ties among Mainland China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is helping to keep the peace. China's communist rulers may yet decide to go to war over its "renegade province," but the economic cost to their economy would be staggering and could provoke a backlash among its citizens. In contrast, poor and isolated North Korea is all the more dangerous because it has nothing to lose economically should it provoke a war. In Central America, countries that were racked by guerrilla wars and death squads two decades ago have turned not only to democracy but to expanding trade, culminating in the Central American Free Trade Agreement with the United States. As the Stockholm institute reports in its 2005 Yearbook, "Since the 1980s, the introduction of a more open economic model in most states of the Latin American and Caribbean region has been accompanied by the growth of new regional structures, the dying out of interstate conflicts and a reduction in intra-state conflicts." Much of the political violence that remains in the world today is concentrated in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa -- the two regions of the world that are the least integrated into the global economy. Efforts to bring peace to those regions must include lowering their high barriers to trade, foreign investment, and domestic entrepreneurship. Advocates of free trade and globalization have long argued that trade expansion means more efficiency, higher incomes, and reduced poverty. The welcome decline of armed conflicts in the past few decades indicates that free trade also comes with its own peace dividend.

#### No security indicts on this flow - Competitiveness exists, our challengers rely on it, and ideology’s key

**Lodge 9**, (George C., “ Ideology and national competitiveness,” Journal of Management Issues, December 22)

First, there is such a thing as a competitive nation;

Second, in this clay and age, ideology is perhaps a nation's most important competitive advantage; and

Third, a communitarian ideology is and will be more competitive than an individualistic one that ideology gives high priority to competitiveness; if it is flexible, capable of adapting and adjusting to the exigencies of the real world; and if institutions such as government and business are efficiently aligned with it.

This argument rests on conceptions of the roles and relationships of government and business which are quite contrary to the beliefs of traditional economists, such as those who currently advise the President of the United States. For them, there is no such thing as a competitive nation; nations do not compete. Firms compete against firms with governments standing on the sidelines, blowing the whistle now and then, but never acting as players, certainly not as a coach. And for the traditionalists, everyone is better off if this competition occurs in a world characterized by free trade, free markets, and flee enterprise; firms benefiting from what the economists call the comparative advantage of their home base; comparative advantage meaning essentially that with which God has endowed the nation.

Textbooks repeat the famous example of David Ricardo. Portugal, endowed with sunshine, was supposed to grow grapes and make wine. Britain, endowed by God with nobody knows quite what, was supposed to make sheep, which in turn made wool, which was to be converted into textiles. And, so said Ricardo, in the best of all possible worlds, it was Portuguese wine for British textiles. Needless to say, Ricardo was English, not Portuguese. And, at the time in which he wrote, textiles was the high value-added, high-income, high-profit, high-wage industry, comparable to semiconductors and computers today (Scott, 1984).

Many of America's competitors have shown this theory to be wrong. You can live on a rock in the fog and be fiercely competitive if as a nation you have the will, the purpose, the discipline, the consensus, the coherence, and the theory.

And how do you measure a nation's competitiveness? You look at its share of world markets, its share of world gross national product, and its ability to earn--not borrow--a rising standard of living for its people. Since a rising living standard means higher wages and less pollution, competitiveness requires that a country move up the ladder of technology, gaining share in the high value-added sectors of tomorrow. This is the story of Korea, Japan, and Singapore, among other countries.

Japan in the early 1960s had essentially no computer industry. Traditional theory would have said that Japan should buy computers from the United States and make the most of its cheap labor force. Japan said no; that is the way to stagnation. We will protect our home market and concentrate our resources to achieve competitiveness, with government and business acting in concert to promote the national goal of global competitiveness. The same theory and practice was of course applied to many other sectors-machine tools, robotics, semiconductors--and it is being applied today to biotechnology, superconductivity, advanced materials, telecommunications, and more.

The fact is, as my colleague Bruce Scott has demonstrated, that nations have strategies; and competitive nations have strategies that make them competitive. These strategies are characterized by high savings and high investment with low capital costs in selected industries, which are chosen by government and business as targets for national endeavor. The strategies are backed by a strong consensus among the people and between managers and managed, and they are complimented by trade policies which provide encouragement to the designated winners but do not protect uncompetitive losers (Scott, 1984: Chapters 1-3; Thurow, 1992).

The strategies of uncompetitive nations like the United States are very nearly the opposite: low savings, high consumption, low investment, incoherent goals, laissez-faire theory, adversarial relations, industry fragmentation, high capital costs, and deteriorating education with incoherent purposes. In the case of the United States, competitiveness has been taken for granted; the nation's purpose was aimed at numerous goals, foreign and domestic. The foreign ones have been largely met: Japan and Germany have been restored, to say the least, and the USSR has crumbled. The domestic ones are contradictory: low taxes, environmental purity, education, welfare, high living standards, less crime, and SO on.

So there are economic winners in the world today who derive their comparative advantage from a particular brand of ideology which I call communitarian, and the United States owes much of its difficulty to the lingering effects of an eroding individualism (Lodge, 1980).

The challenge for the United States is to continue its transition from individualism to communitarianism and to arrive at a synthesis which enables it to make the most of itself (Lodge, 1990).

IDEOLOGY: A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING

Intensifying global competition has been shaping the formation of nations. Especially in the West, global competition has been forcing internal changes upon government, business, and labor. To provide a framework for understanding these strains, let me suggest a hypothesis: Each nation has an ideology, perhaps several. These are a set of beliefs and assumptions about values that the nation holds in order to justify and make legitimate the actions and purpose of its institutions. A nation is successful when its ideology is coherent and adaptable, enabling it to define and attain its goals, and when there is the least distance between the prevailing ideology and the actual practice of the country's institutions.

What is ideology? How can its analysis broaden the understanding of decision makers?

THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY

Ideology is the collection of ideas that a community uses to make values explicit in the real world.

The term "values" in this definition refers to timeless, universal, noncontroversial notions that virtually every community everywhere has always cherished: survival, for example, or justice, economy, self-fulfillment or self-respect. As I use the term, values are held by communities rather than by individual persons.

The phrase "real world" is the collection of phenomena, facts, events, insights, institutions, and forces that affect the community from within and from without: the surrounding reality, the actual environment.

Ideology connects the two: values and real world (see Figure I). Ideology gives values institutional vitality, makes them live in a particular place at a particular time. In ancient Egypt, for example, the values "justice" and "self-fulfillment" involved most inhabitants in lugging stones to glorify the god-king, motivation coming importantly from a whip across the laborer's back. Ideologically, the community was organized around the ideas of a theocratic hierarchy, an imposed consensus kept in place by force, and an extensive set of duties with a few rights of membership. A variety of contextual phenomena, including strong policemen and the need to keep the gods happy in order to obtain rain, sustained the ideology for some thousands of years.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

This definition of "ideology" elaborates on, but nevertheless follows that of the French philosopher, Antoine Destutt de Tracy, who invented the word in 1801 to describe the study of those ideas that have a formative effect on society. This definition is quite different from that of Karl Marx and others for whom ideology was a set of beliefs used by the ruling class to obscure reality, with the sole purpose of perpetuating domination by that class. By my definition, the concept of ideology, may be a weapon of propaganda, but it is also an analytic tool for the study of societies in the tradition of Max Weber, who used the concept to trace the effects of religion on the rise of individualism, and of Karl Mannheim, who developed it as a method of social research.

Ideology is a dynamic structure, a bridge by which these timeless values are connected to the surrounding reality in various cultures at different points in space and time. In the 1980s, Japan was relatively more successful economically than the USSR and the United States because its ideology conformed better with reality and thus supported the actions of government, business, and labor as they competed in the world. Japan's ideology arose, as did that of the United States and the USSR, from its efforts to connect certain values to its surrounding reality. A collection of small infertile islands with a population of some 120 million people, Japan is virtually totally dependent on what has often been a hostile world for the vital natural resources upon which its survival depends. Naturally, the ideology of Japan, the framework of ideas it uses to make values explicit and to justify its institutions, is different from that which took root in nineteenth century America, where a sparse population was trying to tame a wilderness and develop abundant resources. Thus, in Japan, attitudes about the role of government, the role of business, the relationship between the two, the role of trade unions, the means to self-fulfillment and self respect for the individual in the family, in the village, in the firm, and in the nation are all different from corresponding attitudes in the United States.

If a community is to function effectively, its ideology requires scrutiny from time to time so that beliefs and practice can be made more coherent with one another.

The relationship between ideology and practice generally follows a fairly standard pattern over a period of time. During a certain interval, institutional practice conforms to the prevailing ideology. Then changes in the real world induce or compel the institutions to behave differently. At that point, practice begins to depart from ideology. After another interval, institutional practice differs markedly from what ideology declares: the old hymns may be sung but they are not practiced. Ideological schizophrenia sets in: the new practice may evoke a new ideology to justify it, but loyalty to the old ideology discourages it being articulated. There is a gap between institutional practice and ideology--a legitimacy gap (see Figure II). As it widens, two forms of pressure are increasingly brought to bear on leaders. Some of the community seek to haul the institutions back into line with the traditional ideology. Others argue for a new ideology to justify the institution's actual practice. The feature of ideology that bo0th excites and exasperates those who study it is that frequently an old ideology tends to linger on, uninspected, while institutions depart from it in many pragmatic ways. People do not practice what they preach, and they find it difficult to preach what they practice--at least immediately.

## 2nc oil security impact

#### Specifically – key to Chinese oil security

Cerna ‘11 – Michael, China Research Center, China's Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region, 4/15/11, <http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/>]

China’s thirst for natural resources has sent the country in search of sustainable supplies of oil, soy and iron ore. In South America, China has found some of the most well-endowed partners in the world. China is devouring Latin American commodities and eyeing a market of 500 million people. “Countries in South America have arable land and need our technology and investment, and they welcome our companies. § Marked 13:53 § It’s a win-win solution,” said Wang Yunkun, deputy director of the Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, as reported by MercoPress. In 2006, more than 36% of Chile’s total exports were directed toward Asia, with China taking 12% of the total. Chile was the first Latin American country to complete a major bilateral trade agreement with China (Santiso, 2007). Since then China has looked beyond Chile, also targeting Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina and Peru. In 2009, China became Brazil’s largest single export market, eclipsing the U.S. for the first time in history. Later, Brazil’s then-president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, signed an agreement that allowed the China Development Bank and Sinopec to loan Brazil’s state-controlled oil company, Petrobras, $10 billion in return for as many as 200,000 barrels a day of crude oil for ten years (Economist, 2009). This is but one example of how China is seizing lending opportunities in Latin America when traditional lenders such as the Inter-American Development Bank are being pushed to their limits. “Just one of China’s loans, the $10 billion for Brazil’s national oil company, is almost as much as the $11.2 billion in all approved financing by the Inter-American Bank in 2008,” according to The New York Times. It was not only in Brazil that China went after oil. In order to meet rising industrial needs and consumer demand, China has pursued investments and agreements with a variety of Latin American oil producers. In 2007 Venezuela agreed to a $6 billion joint investment fund for infrastructure projects at home and for oil refineries in China able to process Venezuelan heavy crude oil (Santiso, 2007). Venezuela planned to increase oil exports to China by 300,000 barrels per day. Then in 2009, Venezuela announced a $16 billion investment deal with the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for oil exploration in the Orinoco River to develop heavy crude oil resources (Economist, 2009). Meanwhile, the CNPC has invested $300 million in technology to use Venezuela’s Orimulsion fuel in Chinese power plants. This exemplifies Venezuela’s desire to break away from the U.S. During a visit to China in 2004, President Chavez said shifting exports to China would help end dependency on sales to the United States (Johnson, 2005).

#### Chinese energy insecurity causes Asia war

Brandenburg 3/24/20**’**11 Colonel James A. – United States Air Force, China’s Energy Insecurity and the South China Sea Dispute, USAWC Strategy Research Project, p. 6-7

In 2010, China reasserted ownership to nearly 80 percent of the South China Sea, supplementing its claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands. For China and its neighbors, territorial ownership is integral to state sovereignty and security. However, overlapping EEZs, disputes over ownership of the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and China’s mercantilist approach to securing resources stand to raise the energy security stakes of interested parties including the US.16 Feelings of insecurity of those with competing interests in either the EEZ or the Spratly or Paracel Islands could prove challenging especially if China expands its offshore production of oil/natural gas and extends its control over the vessels or pipelines that deliver them via the South China Sea. Experts suggest energy shortages provide the necessary catalyst for arms races, nuclear proliferation, and other forms of instability… in essence, greater energy insecurity equates to the greater probability of geopolitical rivalry.17 Like the US, as China becomes more dependent on oil imports, its ability to ensure access to energy at an affordable price becomes even more critical and could prove difficult given increasing global market uncertainty. Ultimately, China’s dependence on imports could lead to a vicious cycle as it struggles to find ways to mitigate risks and protect its investments in order to offset its insecurity.18 Given global dependence on China’s economy and the potential impact of shrinking energy supplies, this warrants special consideration in the geo-political realm.

#### Goes nuclear

Cirincione 2K Joseph, Director of the Non-Proliferation Project – CEIP, Foreign Policy, 3-22, Lexis

The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble. Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six decades--a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia--whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power--struggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional and global economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.

## UQ

#### China-Cuba relations are deep and rapidly increasing – most recent ev.

Xinhuanet 11/6 – Official Chinese News Network; “China, Cuba FM call for closer cooperation”; November 6, 2013; http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/06/c\_132864939.htm

BEIJING, Nov. 6 (Xinhua) -- Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held talks with his Cuban counterpart Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla on Wednesday, calling for closer cooperation between the two countries.

Wang said the China-Cuba relationship entered a new stage of comprehensive development, and that the range, depth and speed of bilateral cooperation in various fields has reached unprecedented levels.

Wang said China and Cuba have common ideals and beliefs, adding that China cherishes the China-Cuba traditional friendship and is willing to enhance political mutual trust, strengthen pragmatic cooperation and promote common development.

China is also willing to collaborate more closely and support Cuba in international and regional issues, aiming to boost the China-Latin America comprehensive cooperative partnership and safeguard the overall interests of developing countries in both Asia and Latin America, Wang said.

Rodriguez said Cuba is satisfied with the bilateral relationship and willing to enhance cooperation with China in political affairs, trade,culture, and other fields.

Cuba, which currently holds the presidency of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), positively supports the cooperation between China and Latin America, Rodriguez said.

The two sides also exchanged views on issues of common concern, such as the regional situation in Latin America and China-Latin America cooperation.

Rodriguez is paying an official visit to China from Tuesday to Thursday at Wang's invitation.

#### Perception frames the uniqueness debate

Ellis ‘13

Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America,” China Culture, 2013-07-16; <http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm>

In general, the bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of the United States, leading analysts to underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are the sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the world’s youth for American music, media, and lifestyle, the widespread use of the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions.¶ It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China’s current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future.¶ Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The “Bolivarian socialist” regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western “imperialism,” while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism.¶ The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas:■ hopes for future access to Chinese markets ■ hopes for future Chinese investment ■ influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America ■ hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions ■ China as a development model ■ affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic ■ China as “the wave of the future.” In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.

## Link

#### Isolation now—plan reverses that

Tisdall ‘13 (Simon, is an assistant editor of the Guardian and a foreign affairs columnist, “Time for U.S. and Cuba to kiss and make up”, http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/08/opinion/opinion-simon-tisdall-cuba

Chavez was not interested in a rapprochement with the U.S., either by Cuba or Venezuela. His revolutionary beliefs did not allow for an accommodation with the American "imperialists." His successors may not take so militant a line, especially given that Venezuela continues to trade heavily with the U.S., a privilege not allowed Cuba. The so-called "pink tide" that has brought several left-wing leaders to power in Latin America in the past decade is not exactly on the ebb, but the hostility countries such as Brazil, Ecuador and Bolivia felt towards the Bush administration has abated. In fact, according to Sweig's article, U.S. business with Latin America as a whole is booming, up 20% in 2011. The U.S. imports more crude oil from Venezuela and Mexico than from the Persian Gulf, including Saudi Arabia. The U.S. does three times more business with Latin America than with China. The stand-off over Cuba is an obstacle to advancing U.S. interests and business in Latin American countries, and vice versa. The continuation of the embargo has left the U.S. almost totally isolated at the United Nations, and at sharp odds with its major allies, including Britain and the EU.

#### Engagement with Cuba blocks out China

Benjamin-Alvarado ‘6

PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska; The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University. Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, University of Nebraska Omaha1 November 2006

Given that there are no formal diplomatic of economic relations between the governments of the United States and Cuba, the level of interest has grown significantly in the 3 years due primarily to three reasons in the following interest areas: energy 2 security interests; broader regional strategic; and purely economic interests. First, the energy security interests in the potential of Cuban oil – although it really would not minimize the immediacy of an American energy crisis – is seen as possible if only partial remedy to energy supply concerns. Second, as Cuba, in part because of the increasing number of oil partnerships furthers its diplomatic and economic ties to with countries like Venezuela, China, Brazil and members of the European Union it may prove to provide Cuba for a sufficient buffer against U.S. opposition as it solidifies it economic and diplomatic role in the region. This is important inasmuch as there is a de facto trend in the Americas that clearly disavows and attempts to minimize the influence of the United States in the region, and with the growing demands on the world economy by China, it stands to reason that Cuba may assume an increasing stature that almost potentially lessens the presence of American influence in Cuban and hence regional affairs. Finally, and as demonstrated by the presence of American oil interests in the February 2006 U.S.- Cuban Energy Summit in Mexico City, there may be interest in cooperating in joint venture projects, and by extension assisting in the long-term development in Cuba’s oil industry. To accomplish this task the report seeks to lay out some national security policy considerations applying strategic thought to what I will term “Post-Oil” Cuba – a Cuba that has a small but vibrant and growing oil and gas production capacity with extensive relations with a number of partners, and an increasingly positive outlook toward addressing energy and economic development questions that have plagued the Castro regime since the Cuban Revolution.3 The primary consideration is to determine the present state of Cuban energy and what possibilities exist that would be available to American foreign policy decision makers and business interests as the relations with Cuba evolve over the coming years.4 This is important because any realistic appraisal of how Cuba is to take advantage of its oil bonanza involves the United States. Previous research in this area has clearly laid out the scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes in the period since the demise of Cuba’s favorable trade arrangements with the former Soviet Union. Recently, and as a result of the oil discovery and Cuba’s energy arrangement with the government of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela there is renewed interest in Havana’s energy policies. Most of that analysis has been focused on concrete possibilities where there can be cooperation in the energy field between these two neighbors. Specifically, the work has looked at areas for the convergence of energy interests as they apply to the near- and long-term energy development scenarios facing both countries. Myers Jaffe and Soligo have addressed this possibility by looking at the potential to increase diversification and dispersion of energy resources. This is an important consideration when one takes into consideration that well over one-third of all oil refining capacity resides on or near the Houston shipping channel. The potential negative impact on America’s refining capacity following Hurricane Rita5 made a significant impression on oil industry analysts for the necessity of diversifying the location of these vital national resources. The potential of viewing Cuba as a “staging area” for American oil storage and refining is plausible because of the proximity of the island. The also becomes more attractive because of the growing climatic concerns over the uncertain security of oil resources in the Gulf region as clearly demonstrated by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. While it is true that Venezuela has initiated an investment of $1 billion dollars to bring the Cienfuegos 3 refinery online, there are still many other possibilities open and available to American companies, as well as a growing number of foreign firms.6 Additionally, Venezuela remains the fourth largest importer of oil to the United States and one can surmise that the existing trade arrangements between the U.S. and Venezuela will remain intact, the evolution of the Bolivarian revolution under Chavez and a growing Chinese presence in the region notwithstanding. Additionally, pursuing such a path would allow United States policymakers to take advantage of what Cuba has to offer in the following areas: domestic technical capabilities; continuing human capital development; strategic positioning in the Caribbean, and an improved diplomatic stature. Cuba, by any measure, possesses a largely untapped technical capacity owing to advanced training and education in the core mathematic and scientific areas. This was clearly demonstrated by its attempt to develop a nuclear energy capability in the 1980s and 1990s whereby thousands of Cubans pursued highly technical career paths leaving Cuba with among the highest ratios of scientists and engineers to the general population in all of the Americas. Moreover, the foundation of Cuba’s vaunted public education system remains intact and increased investment under various scenarios suggests that Cuba will continue to produce a welleducated workforce that will be critical to its future economic vitality. This raises an important consideration that being the role that Cuba will play in the region in the 21st century. It suffices to say that Cuba remains the strategically important state by virtue of its geographical location alone, in efforts against drug and human trafficking and related national and regional security matters. The extent to which a stable Cuban government has cooperated with the U.S. in drug interdiction efforts in the past suggests that the results from improved diplomatic relations between neighbors would have the effect of improving national security concerns related to terrorist activity, illicit weapons transfers and the like. Ultimately, a successful normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba in these areas may well enhance and stabilize regional relations that could possibly lessen (or at a minimum, balancing) fears of a Chinese incursion in hemispheric affairs. To lessen those fears it may be useful to review the present structure of joint-venture projects in the energy sector in Cuba to ascertain the feasibility and possible success of such an undertaking become available to American firms. Moreover, it is interesting to note that U.S. firms in the agriculture sector have successfully negotiated and consummated sales to Cuba totaling more than $1 billion dollars over the past four years under conditions that are less than optimal circumstances but have well-served the commercial interests of all parties involved.